/*! This file is auto-generated */ .wp-block-button__link{color:#fff;background-color:#32373c;border-radius:9999px;box-shadow:none;text-decoration:none;padding:calc(.667em + 2px) calc(1.333em + 2px);font-size:1.125em}.wp-block-file__button{background:#32373c;color:#fff;text-decoration:none} Problem 27 The Slate Company manufactures a... [FREE SOLUTION] | 91Ó°ÊÓ

91Ó°ÊÓ

The Slate Company manufactures and sells television sets. Its assembly division (AD) buys television screens from the screen division (SD) and assembles the TV sets. The SD, which is operating at capacity, incurs an incremental manufacturing cost of \(\$ 65\) per screen. The SD can sell all its output to the outside market at a price of \(\$ 100\) per screen, after incurring a variable marketing and distribution cost of \(\$ 8\) per screen. If the \(A D\) purchases screens from outside suppliers at a price of \(\$ 100\) per screen, it will incur a variable purchasing cost of \(\$ 7\) per screen. Slate's division managers can act autonomously to maximize their own division's operating income. 1\. What is the minimum transfer price at which the SD manager would be willing to sell screens to the AD? 2\. What is the maximum transfer price at which the AD manager would be willing to purchase screens from the SD? 3\. Now suppose that the SD can sell only \(70 \%\) of its output capacity of 20,000 screens per month on the open market. Capacity cannot be reduced in the short run. The AD can assemble and sell more than \(20,000 \mathrm{TV}\) sets per month. a. What is the minimum transfer price at which the SD manager would be willing to sell screens to the AD? b. From the point of view of Slate's management, how much of the SD output should be transferred to the AD? c. If Slate mandates the SD and AD managers to "split the difference" on the minimum and maximum transfer prices they would be willing to negotiate over, what would be the resulting transfer price? Does this price achieve the outcome desired in requirement 3 b?

Short Answer

Expert verified
1. Minimum transfer price (SD to AD) is \$92; 2. Maximum price AD pays is \$107; 3a. Minimum price for excess is \$65; 3b. Transfer 6,000 screens; 3c. Resulting price is \$86, fulfilling the goal.

Step by step solution

01

Understanding SD's Minimum Transfer Price (1)

When the Screen Division (SD) sells to the outside market, they earn a net price of \(\\(100 - \\)8 = \\(92\). Therefore, the transfer price for selling screens to the Assembly Division (AD) must at least cover this contribution margin of \\)92. The minimum transfer price would thus be \$92.
02

Determining AD's Maximum Willingness to Pay (2)

The Assembly Division (AD) incurs \(\\(100 + \\)7 = \\(107\) when purchasing from an outside supplier. Therefore, the maximum transfer price AD would be willing to pay SD is anything up to \\)107, as it should not exceed the outside purchase cost.
03

SD's Minimum Transfer Price with Excess Capacity (3a)

SD can sell only 70% of 20,000 screens, which is 14,000 screens, to the open market at \\(92 per screen. The remaining 30% of capacity (6,000 screens) only need to cover the incremental manufacturing cost of \\)65. Therefore, for these excess screens, the minimum transfer price is \$65 per screen.
04

Optimizing Output Transfer (3b)

SD should sell 14,000 screens to the outside market and transfer 6,000 screens to AD, as this utilizes full capacity while maximizing income for the company. SD achieves maximum output efficiency, and AD can assemble additional TV sets, benefiting the overall company.
05

Settling on a Compromised Transfer Price (3c)

The range for negotiation is between \\(65 (minimum SD needs for excess capacity) and \\)107 (maximum AD willing to pay). "Splitting the difference" results in a transfer price of \((\\(65 + \\)107)/2 = \$86\). This price allows transfer of the 6,000 excess units.

Unlock Step-by-Step Solutions & Ace Your Exams!

  • Full Textbook Solutions

    Get detailed explanations and key concepts

  • Unlimited Al creation

    Al flashcards, explanations, exams and more...

  • Ads-free access

    To over 500 millions flashcards

  • Money-back guarantee

    We refund you if you fail your exam.

Over 30 million students worldwide already upgrade their learning with 91Ó°ÊÓ!

Key Concepts

These are the key concepts you need to understand to accurately answer the question.

Incremental Manufacturing Cost
Incremental manufacturing cost refers to the additional cost incurred to produce one more unit of product. For the Screen Division (SD) of The Slate Company, this cost is crucial in determining pricing strategies, especially with the concept of transfer pricing. Each screen has an incremental manufacturing cost of $65, which forms the base requirement for covering costs when selling to the Assembly Division (AD) or the open market.

This cost is different from total manufacturing costs because it only considers the additional expenses directly related to producing more screens. Therefore, when SD has excess capacity, it can afford to lower its transfer prices to just above this cost to ensure at least new-produced screens cover their direct expenses without losing financially.
Capacity Utilization
Capacity utilization measures how well a division or business is using its available production capacity. It's an important concept in the exercise involving The Slate Company since SD is operating at full capacity. When operating at full capacity, a company must decide how to allocate limited resources between internal needs (like supplying AD) and external sales that might bring in higher profits.

If SD has excess capacity, as shown in the example where only 70% of screens can be sold to the open market, they can choose to supply the remaining 30% to AD at a reduced cost, ensuring optimal use of total production capability. Hence, capacity utilization impacts strategic decisions such as pricing and output distribution within the company to maximize overall profits.
Division Autonomy
Division autonomy is the independence given to each division manager to make their own decisions that maximize their division’s operating income. In The Slate Company exercise, both SD and AD managers operate autonomously, which means they decide on transfer pricing based on their division's best interest.

While this autonomy promotes flexibility and encourages managers to closely align with the financial health of their own divisions, it can lead to intra-organizational conflicts if one division's objectives do not align with the company's overall profitability. Balancing such autonomy with overarching corporate goals is critical, as seen in the exercise when settling on transfer prices that benefit the entire Slate Company rather than just individual divisions.
Marginal Cost Analysis
Marginal cost analysis involves examining the cost-effectiveness of producing additional units. In the context of the exercise, when SD has excess capacity, the marginal cost of producing additional screens is essentially the incremental manufacturing cost, which allows them to lower the transfer price to $65 for excess screens sold to AD.

Performing a marginal cost analysis helps in setting transfer prices that can optimize company profits while also accounting for fluctuating production levels. By knowing their marginal costs, the SD can settle on transfer prices that cover expenses and promote cohesive operation within the firm. This form of analysis aids in making informed decisions about production and internal transfers, especially when divisions are tasked to "split the difference" between varying optimal pricing strategies.

One App. One Place for Learning.

All the tools & learning materials you need for study success - in one app.

Get started for free

Most popular questions from this chapter

(J. Patell, adapted) The California Instrument Company (CIC) consists of the semiconductor division and the process-control division, each of which operates as an independent profit center. The semiconductor division employs craftsmen who produce two different electronic components: the new high- performance Super-chip and an older product called Okay-chip. These two products have the following cost characteristics: $$\begin{array}{lcc} & \text { Super-chip } & \text { Okay-chip } \\ \hline \text { Direct materials } & \$ 5 & \$ 2 \\ \text { Direct manufacturing labor, 3 hours } \times \$ 20 ; 1 \text { hour } \times \$ 20 & 60 & 20 \end{array}$$ Due to the high skill level necessary for the craftsmen, the semiconductor division's capacity is set at 45,000 hours per year. Maximum demand for the Super-chip is 15,000 units annually, at a price of \(\$ 80\) per chip. There is unlimited demand for the Okay-chip at \(\$ 26\) per chip. The process-control division produces only one product, a process-control unit, with the following cost structure: The current market price for the control unit is \(\$ 132\) per unit. A joint research project has just revealed that a single Super-chip could be substituted for the circuit board currently used to make the process-control unit. Direct labor cost of the process-control unit would be unchanged. The improved process-control unit could be sold for \(\$ 145\) 1\. Calculate the contribution margin per direct-labor hour of selling Super- chip and Okay-chip. If no transfers of Super-chip are made to the process- control division, how many Super-chips and Okay-chips should the semiconductor division manufacture and sell? What would be the division's's annual contribution margin? Show your computations. 2\. The process-control division expects to sell 5,000 process-control units this year. From the viewpoint of California Instruments as a whole, should 5,000 Super-chips be transferred to the process-control division to replace circuit boards? Show your computations 3\. What transfer price, or range of prices, would ensure goal congruence among the division managers? Show your calculations. 4\. If labor capacity in the semiconductor division were 60,000 hours instead of \(45,000,\) would your answer to requirement 3 differ? Show your calculations

Give two reasons why the dual-pricing system of transfer pricing is not widely used.

British Columbia Lumber has a raw lumber division and a finished lumber division. The variable costs are as follows: Raw lumber division: \(\$ 100\) per 100 board-feet of raw lumber. Finished lumber division: \(\$ 125\) per 100 board-feet of finished lumber. Assume that there is no board-feet loss in processing raw lumber into finished lumber. Raw lumber can be sold at \(\$ 200\) per 100 board-feet. Finished lumber can be sold at \(\$ 275\) per 100 board-feet. 1\. Should British Columbia Lumber process raw lumber into its finished form? Show your calculations. 2\. Assume that internal transfers are made at \(110 \%\) of variable cost. Will each division maximize its division operating-income contribution by adopting the action that is in the best interest of British Columbia Lumber as a whole? Explain. 3\. Assume that internal transfers are made at market prices. Will each division maximize its division operating-income contribution by adopting the action that is in the best interest of British Columbia Lumber as a whole? Explain.

The Allison-Chambers Corporation, manufacturer of tractors and other heavy farm equipment, is organized along decentralized product lines, with each manufacturing division operating as a separate profit center. Each division manager has been delegated full authority on all decisions involving the sale of that division's output both to outsiders and to other divisions of Allison- Chambers. Division \(C\) has in the past always purchased its requirement of a particular tractor-engine component from division A. However, when informed that division \(A\) is increasing its selling price to \(\$ 150,\) division C's manager decides to purchase the engine component from external suppliers. 1\. Assume that there are no alternative uses for internal facilities of division A. Determine whether the com pany as a whole will benefit if divisision C purchases the component from external suppliers for \(\$ 135\) per unit What should the transfer price for the component be set at so that division managers acting in their own divisisions' best interests take actions that are also in the bestinterest of the company as a whole? 2\. Assume that internal facilities of division A would not otherwise be idle. By not producing the 1,000 units for division C, divisision A's equipment and other facilities would be used for other production operations that would result in annual cash-operating savings of \(\$ 18,000\). Should division C purchase from external suppliers? Show your computations. 3\. Assume that there are no alternative uses for division A's internal facilitites and that the price from out siders drops \(\$ 20 .\) Should division C purchase from external suppliers? What should the transfer price for the component be set at so that division managers acting in their own divisisions' best interests take actions that are also in the best interest of the company as a whole?

Name three benefits and two costs of decentralization.

See all solutions

Recommended explanations on Math Textbooks

View all explanations

What do you think about this solution?

We value your feedback to improve our textbook solutions.

Study anywhere. Anytime. Across all devices.