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91Ó°ÊÓ

\((\mathrm{CMA}, \text { adapted). }\) Quest Motors, Inc., operates as a decentralized multidivision company. The Vivo division of Quest Motors purchases most of its airbags from the airbag division. The airbag division's incremental cost for manufacturing the airbags is 90 dollarper unit. The airbag division is currently working at \(80 \%\) of capacity. The current market price of the airbags is 125 dollar per unit. 1\. Using the general guideline presented in the chapter, what is the minimum price at which the airbag division would sell airbags to the Vivo division? 2\. Suppose that Quest Motors requires that whenever divisions with unused capacity sell products internally, they must do so at the incremental cost. Evaluate this transfer-pricing policy using the criteria of goal congruence, evaluating division performance, motivating management effort, and preserving division autonomy. 3\. If the two divisions were to negotiate a transfer price, what is the range of possible transfer prices? Evaluate this negotiated transfer-pricing policy using the criteria of goal congruence, evaluating division performance, motivating management effort, and preserving division autonomy. 4\. Instead of allowing negotiation, suppose that Quest specifies a hybrid transfer price that "splits the difference" between the minimum and maximum prices from the divisions' standpoint. What would be the resulting transfer price for airbags?

Short Answer

Expert verified
The minimum transfer price at which the airbag division would sell airbags to the Vivo division is 90 dollars per unit. The range of possible transfer prices lies between 90 and 125 dollars per unit. A hybrid transfer price, calculated by averaging the minimum and maximum prices, would result in a transfer price of 107.5 dollars per unit.

Step by step solution

01

1. Minimum Transfer Price

First, let's find the minimum transfer price, which is the incremental cost of manufacturing the airbags. The incremental cost per unit is given as 90 dollars. So, the minimum transfer price at which the airbag division would sell airbags to the Vivo division is 90 dollars per unit.
02

2. Evaluate Transfer-Pricing Policy at Incremental Cost

Now, let's evaluate the transfer-pricing policy of selling products at the incremental cost when the division has unused capacity: - Goal Congruence: This policy promotes goal congruence as the selling division incentives align with the company's goal of maximizing profit by utilizing the unused capacity. - Evaluating Division Performance: The transfer price equals the incremental cost, so the selling division's performance is fairly evaluated as they cover production costs. - Motivating Management Effort: This policy is less effective in motivating management effort as there is no additional revenue generated for the selling division beyond covering the incremental cost. This may lead to lower motivation for the selling division to increase efficiency or innovatively look for growth opportunities. - Preserving Division Autonomy: The policy hinders the preservation of division autonomy as it imposes a fixed transfer price that may not serve the best interests of both divisions, limiting the potential for negotiation.
03

3. Range of Possible Transfer Prices and Negotiated Transfer-Pricing Policy Evaluation

The range of possible transfer prices would be between the minimum transfer price, which is the incremental cost of 90 dollars, and the current market price of 125 dollars per unit. Evaluating this policy using the specified criteria: - Goal Congruence: The policy promotes goal congruence as both divisions would negotiate to maximize their individual profits, which collectively would benefit the company. - Evaluating Division Performance: Negotiated transfer prices can fairly evaluate each division's performance as both would agree to prices reflecting their respective costs and revenues. - Motivating Management Effort: This policy effectively motivates management as both divisions have the opportunity to negotiate better prices, which encourages aligning interests and increasing efficiency. - Preserving Division Autonomy: The negotiated transfer-pricing policy helps in preserving division autonomy as each division can negotiate based on their respective interests and market conditions.
04

4. Hybrid Transfer Price Calculation

Now, let's find the hybrid transfer price by averaging the minimum and maximum prices from the divisions' standpoint. This will involve "splitting the difference" between the incremental cost of 90 dollars (minimum) and the market price of 125 dollars (maximum). Hybrid Transfer Price = \(\frac{90 + 125}{2}\) = \(\frac{215}{2}\) = 107.5 dollars Thus, the resulting hybrid transfer price for airbags would be 107.5 dollars per unit.

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Key Concepts

These are the key concepts you need to understand to accurately answer the question.

Decentralized Company
A decentralized company is an organizational structure where decision-making is distributed among various divisions or units, rather than being concentrated at the top management level. This approach allows each division to operate independently, making decisions quickly without the constant necessity to consult upper management.

In companies like Quest Motors, decentralization is crucial as it allows each division, such as the Vivo and Airbag divisions, to focus on their specific markets and operational goals. Each division has the ability to make decisions that directly impact their performance, leading to potential increases in efficiency and innovation.
  • This structure enables a company to react swiftly to market changes.
  • It encourages divisional managers to develop a sense of ownership and motivation.
  • However, it also necessitates a well-defined transfer pricing policy to ensure the divisions operate in alignment with the overall company objectives.
Overall, a decentralized company can support quicker decision-making and more tailored responses to market needs, provided there is a strong framework for communication and collaboration among divisions.
Goal Congruence
Goal congruence in a decentralized environment refers to the alignment between individual division objectives and the overall goals of the company. Achieving goal congruence is essential for ensuring that the decisions made by each division contribute positively to the company’s success.

At Quest Motors, policies surrounding transfer pricing play a vital role in promoting goal congruence. For example, when transfer prices are set to reflect the incremental cost during periods of unused capacity, they encourage divisions to utilize resources efficiently.
  • Goal congruence is critical in preventing conflicts between divisional goals and corporate objectives.
  • It helps ensure that each division's operations and strategies support overall profitability.
  • Effective transfer pricing strategies are key to aligning efforts across divisions, benefiting the whole company.
The challenge lies in balancing competitiveness and cooperation among divisions, to ensure that their individual strategies contribute to, rather than detract from, shared company goals.
Division Autonomy
Division autonomy is the degree of independence each division within a decentralized company enjoys. This autonomy empowers divisional managers to make decisions most suited for their market, which can enhance flexibility and responsiveness to local demands.

In Quest Motors, allowing divisions like Vivo and Airbag to negotiate their transfer prices exemplifies preserving division autonomy. This process ensures that divisions can operate in a manner that best suits their unique needs.
  • A high level of autonomy often leads to better decision-making and a sense of empowerment among division managers.
  • Balancing autonomy with overarching corporate strategies is crucial to harnessing the benefits without risking misalignment.
  • Transfer pricing policies significantly influence whether autonomy is preserved; fair negotiation practices reflect true market conditions and divisional independence.
It's vital to maintain open communication and establish clear guidelines to prevent autonomy from leading to divisional goals that compete with corporate objectives.
Incremental Cost Analysis
Incremental cost analysis is a technique used to determine the cost of producing one additional unit of product. This analysis is crucial for internal decision-making in decentralized companies, especially when determining transfer prices between divisions.

At Quest Motors, the incremental cost of producing each airbag is $90, which serves as the minimum transfer price during periods of unused capacity. This reflects the additional costs incurred by the selling division, ensuring that at least these costs are covered when setting internal prices.
  • Incremental cost analysis helps in identifying the true cost of additional production, which is essential for setting base prices for internal transactions.
  • When divisions operate under the directive to trade at incremental costs, it promotes fairness and ensures no division operates at a loss.
  • Proper understanding of incremental costs aids in goal congruence and division performance evaluation by providing a clear cost baseline for decision-making.
Using this analysis helps divisions evaluate whether internal pricing strategies will support or hinder the company’s financial goals, fostering transparency and informed decision-making across the organization.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

Give two reasons why the dual-pricing system of transfer pricing is not widely used.

Compost Systems, Inc. (CSI) operates a composting service business and produces organic fertilizer that it sells to farmers in the Midwest. CSI operates with two divisions, collection and composting. The collection division contracts with universities, hospitals, and other large institutions to provide compostable waste collection bins in their dining service areas, and hauls the waste away daily. The waste providers pay the collection division a monthly fee for this service, and the collection division in turn charges the composting division for the compostable materials at a full-cost transfer price of 200 dollar per ton. Monthly, CSI collects and transfers 1,000 tons of waste. The composting division processes the waste, places it in bins, adds microbes to break down the organic material, and ultimately delivers the fertilizer it produces to farmers for use in their fields. After the removal of water, 1,000 tons of waste produces 500 tons of fertilizer. Demand for the fertilizer has risen steeply as consumer demand for organic produce has increased in recent years. Below are key data related to CSl's monthly operations: The composting division has demand for an additional 200 tons of fertilizer per month. To provide the 400 tons of compostable waste necessary to meet the increased demand, the collection division will have to invest in additional marketing and equipment that will increase monthly fixed costs by 28,000 dollar. Estimated additional monthly revenue to the collection division from waste providers is 10,000 dollar. 1\. Compute the new full-cost transfer price if it is applied to all waste transferred to the composting division. 2\. Compute the new full-cost transfer price if it is applied to just the additional 400 tons. 3\. What difficulties do you see in using a full-cost transfer-pricing system in the future? 4\. The composting division has identified a source of additional compostable waste at a price of 205 dollar per ton. What would be the impact on the company as a whole if the 400 tons of material is purchased from the outside supplier? As a decentralized unit, what decision would the composting division make regarding the additional material? 5\. Would a market-based transfer price be agreeable to both divisional managers?

Cocoa Mill Chocolates manufactures specialty chocolates and sells them to fine candy stores. The company operates two divisions, cocoa and candy, as decentralized entities. The cocoa division purchases raw cacao beans and processes them into cocoa powder. The candy division purchases cocoa powder and other ingredients and uses them to produce gourmet chocolates. The cocoa division is free to sell processed cocoa to outside buyers, and the candy division is free to purchase processed cocoa from other sources. Currently, however, the cocoa division sells all of its output to the candy division, and the candy division does not purchase materials from outside suppliers. The processed cocoa is transferred from the cocoa division to the production division at \(110 \%\) of full cost. The cocoa division purchases raw cacao beans for 4 dollar per pound. The cocoa division uses 1.25 pounds of raw cacao beans to produce one pound of processed cocoa. The division's other variable costs equal 1.25 dollar per pound of output, and fixed costs at a monthly production level of 20,000 pounds of cocoa are 0.75 dollar per pound. During the most recent month, 20,000 pounds of processed cocoa were transferred between the two divisions. The cocoa division's capacity is 25,000 pounds of output. With the increase in demand for dark chocolate, the candy production division expects to use 22,000 pounds of cocoa next month. Franklin Foods has offered to sell 2,000 pounds of cocoa next month to the candy production division for 7.50 dollar per pound. 1\. Compute the transfer price per pound of processed cocoa. If each division is considered a profit center, would the candy production manager choose to purchase 2,000 pounds next month from Franklin Foods? 2\. What would be the cost to Cocoa Mill Chocolates if the 2,000 pounds had been produced by the cocoa division and transferred to the candy division? Is the external purchase in the best interest of Cocoa Mill Chocolates? What is the cause of this goal incongruence? 3\. The candy division manager suggests that \(\$ 7.50\) is now the market price for processed cocoa, and that this should be the new transfer price. Cocoa Mill's corporate management tends to agree. The cocoa division manager is suspicious. Franklin's prices have always been much higher than 7.50 dollar per pound. Why the sudden price cut? After further investigation by the cocoa division manager, it is revealed that the 7.50 dollar per pound price was a one-time-only offer made to the candy division due to excess inventory at Franklin. Future orders would be priced at 8.00 dollar per pound. Comment on the validity of the 7.50 dollar per pound market price and the ethics of the candy manager. Would changing the transfer price to 7.50 dollar matter to Cocoa Mill Chocolates?

Calgary Lumber has a raw lumber division and a finished lumber division. The variable costs are as follows: \(\bullet\)Raw lumber division: 125 dollar per 100 board-feet of raw lumber \(\bullet\)Finished lumber division: 145 dollar per 100 board-feet of finished lumber Assume that there is no board-feet loss in processing raw lumber into finished lumber. Raw lumber can be sold at 175 dollar per 100 board-feet. Finished lumber can be sold at 345 dollar per 100 board-feet. 1\. Should Calgary Lumber process raw lumber into its finished form? Show your calculations. 2\. Assume that internal transfers are made at \(130 \%\) of variable cost. Will each division maximize its division operating-income contribution by adopting the action that is in the best interest of Calgary Lumber as a whole? Explain. 3\. Assume that internal transfers are made at market prices. Will each division maximize its division operating-income contribution by adopting the action that is in the best interest of Calgary Lumber as a whole? Explain.

How should managers consider income tax issues when choosing a transfer- pricing method?

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