Chapter 22: Problem 7
What are the three methods for determining transfer prices?
Short Answer
Step by step solution
Key Concepts
These are the key concepts you need to understand to accurately answer the question.
/*! This file is auto-generated */ .wp-block-button__link{color:#fff;background-color:#32373c;border-radius:9999px;box-shadow:none;text-decoration:none;padding:calc(.667em + 2px) calc(1.333em + 2px);font-size:1.125em}.wp-block-file__button{background:#32373c;color:#fff;text-decoration:none}
Learning Materials
Features
Discover
Chapter 22: Problem 7
What are the three methods for determining transfer prices?
These are the key concepts you need to understand to accurately answer the question.
All the tools & learning materials you need for study success - in one app.
Get started for free
Host Hotels, a small chain of business hotels in the Mid- Atlantic region, is interested in gaining access to the boutique lodging market by acquiring a hotel group in that sector. Host Hotels intends to operate the newly acquired hotels independently from the rest of its chain, while pursuing other boutique market opportunities in other cities. One of the prospects is Bennington Properties, a group of 10 historic hotels in Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Washington. All hotels in the group include the name "Bennington," as in Mainline Bennington, Georgetown Bennington, etc. Buying for all 20 hotels is done by the company's central office. Hotel managers must follow strict guidelines for all aspects of hotel management in an attempt to maintain consistency across locations. Hotel managers are evaluated on the basis of achieving profit goals developed by the central office. The other prospect is Eastern Innkeepers, a group of 25 spa retreats, bed and breakfasts, and countrin inns in rural Virginia and North Carolina. Each property in the group was previously an independently owned company. Many of the previous owners are now employed as individual property managers. These manag. ers are given significant flexibility in decision making, allowing them to negotiate purchases with suppliers and develop property marketing plans. Managers are rewarded for exceeding self-developed return-on investment goalswith company stock options. Some managers have become significant shareholders in the company, and some managers have even recommended decisions to acquire additional real estate. However, the increased autonomy has led to compettition and price cutting among Eastern Innkeepers properties wittin the same geographic market, resulting in lower margins. 1\. Would you describe Bennington Properties as having a centralized or a decentralized structure? Explain. 2\. Would you describe Eastern Innkeepers as having a centralized or a decentralized structure? Discuss some of the benefits and costs of that type of structure. 3\. Would hotels in each chain be considered cost centers, revenue centers, profit centers, or investment centers? How does that tie into the evaluation of property managers? 4\. Assume that Host Hotels chooses to acquire Eastern Innkeepers. What steps can the management of Host Hotels take to improve goal congruence between property managers and the larger company?
The Slate Company manufactures and sells television sets. Its assembly division (AD) buys television screens from the screen division (SD) and assembles the TV sets. The SD, which is operating at capacity, incurs an incremental manufacturing cost of 65 dollar per screen. The SD can sell all its output to the outside market at a price of 100 dollar per screen, after incurring a variable marketing and distribution cost of 8 dollar per screen. If the \(A D\) purchases screens from outside suppliers at a price of 100 dollar per screen, it will incur a variable purchasing cost of 7 dollar per screen. Slate's division managers can act autonomously to maximize their own division's operating income. 1\. What is the minimum transfer price at which the SD manager would be willing to sell screens to the AD? 2\. What is the maximum transfer price at which the AD manager would be willing to purchase screens from the SD? 3\. Now suppose that the SD can sell only \(70 \%\) of its output capacity of 20,000 screens per month on the open market. Capacity cannot be reduced in the short run. The AD can assemble and sell more than \(20,000 \mathrm{TV}\) sets per month. a. What is the minimum transfer price at which the SD manager would be willing to sell screens to the AD? b. From the point of view of Slate's management, how much of the SD output should be transferred to the AD? c. If Slate mandates the SD and AD managers to "split the difference" on the minimum and maximum transfer prices they would be willing to negotiate over, what would be the resulting transfer price? Does this price achieve the outcome desired in requirement \(3 b ?\)
What is one potential limitation of full-cost-based transfer prices?
(J. Patell, adapted) Sierra Inc. consists of a semiconductor division and a process-control division, each of which operates as an independent profit center. The semiconductor division employs craftsmen who produce two different electronic components: the new highperformance Xcel-chip and an older product called the Dcel-chip. These products have the following cost characteristics: Due to the high skill level necessary for the craftsmen, the semiconductor division's capacity is set at 55,000 hours per year. Maximum demand for the Xcel-chip is 13,750 units annually, at a price of 130 dollar per chip. There is unlimited demand for the Dcel-chip at 65 dollar per chip. The process-control division produces only one product, a process-control unit, with the following cost structure: \(\bullet\)Direct materials (circuit board): 80 dollar \(\bullet\)Direct manufacturing labor (3.5 \(\text { hours }\) times 10 dollar): 35 dollar The current market price for the control unit is 125 dollar per unit. A joint research project has just revealed that a single \(X\) cel-chip could be substituted for the circuit board currently used to make the process-control unit. The direct manufacturing labor cost of the processcontrol unit would be unchanged. The improved process-control unit could be sold for 185 dollar. 1\. Calculate the contribution margin per direct-labor hour of selling Xcel- chip and Dcel-chip. If no transfers of Xcel-chip are made to the process- control division, how many Xcel-chips and Dcel-chips should the semiconductor division manufacture and sell? What would be the division's annual contribution margin? Show your computations. 2\. The process-control division expects to sell 1,250 process-control units this year. From the viewpoint of Sierra Inc. as a whole, should \(1,250 \mathrm{Xcel}\) -chips be transferred to the process-control division to replace circuit boards? Show your computations. 3\. What transfer price, or range of prices, would ensure goal congruence among the division managers? Show your calculations. 4\. If labor capacity in the semiconductor division were 60,000 hours instead of 55,000 , would your answer to requirement 3 differ? Show your calculations.
Under what conditions is a market-based transfer price optimal?
What do you think about this solution?
We value your feedback to improve our textbook solutions.