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Two firms compete in selling identical widgets. They choose their output levels Q1 and Q2 simultaneously and face the demand curve P = 30 鈥 Q where Q = Q1 + Q2. Until recently, both firms had zero marginal costs. Recent environmental regulations have increased Firm 2's marginal cost to $15. Firm 1's marginal cost remains constant at zero. True or false: As a result, the market price will rise to the monopoly level.

Short Answer

Expert verified

The statement is true.

Step by step solution

01

Determination of monopoly market price

The monopoly market represents a market where only one seller operates the market and controls the price. The monopolist producer operates at the level where marginal revenue is equal to marginal cost.

The price and quantity are calculated below:

P=30-QTR=30Q-Q2MR=30-2QMC=$0MR=MC30-2Q=02Q=30Q=15P=30-15=$15

The price will be $15, and the quantity will be 15 units.

02

Price when marginal cost increases to $15

Two firms are operating in the market; the marginal revenue and marginal cost are equated with generating each firm's reaction curve.

Assuming that both firms know about the other firm's marginal cost and that they know that the other firm knows this:

Firm 1's reaction curve is calculated below:

P=30-Q1-Q2TR1=30Q1-Q12-Q1Q2MR1=30-2Q1-Q2MC1=$0MR1=MC130-2Q1-Q2=0Q1=30-Q22....................i

Firm 2's reaction curve is calculated below:

P=30-Q1-Q2TR2=30Q2-Q22-Q1Q2MR2=30-2Q2-Q1MC2=$15MR2=MC230-2Q2-Q1=15Q2=15-Q12....................ii

From i and ii,

Q1=30-15-Q122Q1=60-15+Q144Q1-Q1=45Q1=453=15Q2=15-152=0

The output for firm 1 will be 15 units, and for firm 2 will be 0.

The price is calculated below:

P = 30 - 15 - 0

=$15

The price will be $15. Thus, the price is equal to the monopoly price.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

A monopolist can produce at a constant average (and marginal) cost of AC = MC = \(5. It faces a market demand curve given by Q = 53 - P.

  1. Calculate the profit-maximizing price and quantity for this monopolist. Also calculate its profits.
  2. Suppose a second firm enters the market. Let Q1 be the output of the first firm and Q2 be the output of the second. Market demand is now given by

Q1 + Q2 = 53 - P

Assuming that this second firm has the same costs as the first, write the profits of each firm as functions of Q1 and Q2.

c. Suppose (as in the Cournot model) that each firm chooses its profit maximizing level of output on the assumption that its competitor鈥檚 output is fixed. Find each firm鈥檚 鈥渞eaction curve鈥 (i.e., the rule that gives its desired output in terms of its competitor鈥檚 output).

d. Calculate the Cournot equilibrium (i.e., the values of Q1 and Q2 for which each firm is doing as well as it can given its competitor鈥檚 output). What are the resulting market price and profits of each firm?

e. Suppose there are N firms in the industry, all with the same constant marginal cost, MC = \)5. Find the Cournot equilibrium. How much will each firm produce, what will be the market price, and how much profit will each firm earn? Also, show that as N becomes large, the market price approaches the price that would prevail under perfect competition.

Two firms compete by choosing price. Their demand functions are

Q1 = 20 - P1 + P2

and

Q2 = 20 + P1 - P2

where P1 and P2 are the prices charged by each firm, respectively, and Q1 and Q2 are the resulting demands. Note that the demand for each good depends only on the difference in prices; if the two firms colluded and set the same price, they could make that price as high as they wanted, and earn infinite profits. Marginal costs are zero.

  1. Suppose the two firms set their prices at the same time. Find the resulting Nash equilibrium. What price will each firm charge, how much will it sell, and what will its profit be? (Hint: Maximize the profit of each firm with respect to its price.)
  2. Suppose Firm 1 sets its price first and then Firm 2 sets its price. What price will each firm charge, how much will it sell, and what will its profit be?
  3. Suppose you are one of these firms and that there are three ways you could play the game: (i) Both firms set price at the same time; (ii) You set price first; or (iii) Your competitor sets price first. If you could choose among these options, which would you prefer? Explain why.

Suppose the market for tennis shoes has one dominant firm and five fringe firms. The market demand is Q = 400 - 2 P. The dominant firm has a constant marginal cost of 20. The fringe firms each have a marginal cost of MC = 20 + 5q.

a. Verify that the total supply curve for the five fringe firms is Qf = P - 20.

b. Find the dominant firm鈥檚 demand curve.

c. Find the profit-maximizing quantity produced and the price charged by the dominant firm, and the quantity produced and the price charged by each of the fringe firms.

d. Suppose there are 10 fringe firms instead of five. How does this change your results?

e. Suppose there continue to be five fringe firms but that each manages to reduce its marginal cost to MC = 20 + 2q. How does this change your results?

Suppose all firms in a monopolistically competitive industry were merged into one large firm. Would that new firm produce as many different brands? Would it produce only a single brand? Explain.

Consider two firms facing the demand curve P = 50 - 5Q, where Q = Q1 + Q2. The firms鈥 cost functions are C1(Q1) = 20 + 10 Q1 and C2(Q2) = 10 + 12 Q2.

  1. Suppose both firms have entered the industry. What is the joint profit-maximizing level of output? How much will each firm produce? How would your answer change if the firms have not yet entered the industry?
  2. What is each firm鈥檚 equilibrium output and profit if they behave noncooperatively? Use the Cournot model. Draw the firms鈥 reaction curves and show the equilibrium.
  3. How much should Firm 1 be willing to pay to purchase Firm 2 if collusion is illegal but a takeover is not?
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