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Two farmers, Tito and Helen, supply a chain of islands with kale. The inverse demand for kale in the islands is given by \(P=60-0.5 Q\) where \(Q\) is the combined output of Tito \(\left(q_{T}\right)\) and Helen \(\left(q_{H}\right)\). measured in 10 -pound bunches. Tito grows kale at a constant marginal and average cost of \(\$ 12\) per bunch; Helen grows kale at a constant marginal and average cost of \(\$ 10\) per bunch. a. Suppose this market is a Stackelberg oligopoly and Tito is the first-mover. How much will he and Helen produce? What will the market price of kale be? How much profit will each farmer earn? b. Now suppose that Helen is the first-mover in this Stackelberg oligopoly. How much will each farmer produce? What will the market price of kale be? How much profit will each farmer earn? c. Quantify the value to Helen of being the first-mover in this Stackelberg game.

Short Answer

Expert verified
a) Tito: 28.67, Helen: 42.83, Price: $24.25, Tito's profit: $349.63, Helen's profit: $615.64. b) Helen: 60, Tito: 18, Price: $21, Helen's profit: $660, Tito's profit: $162. c) Helen gains $44.36 more as the first mover.

Step by step solution

01

Understanding Stackelberg Model

In the Stackelberg model, one firm is the leader and the other is the follower. The leader commits to a quantity first, and the follower reacts to this quantity.
02

Tito as First Mover (Finding Reaction Function)

Since Tito is the first mover, he chooses his quantity \(q_T\) considering Helen's reaction. The reaction function for Helen is derived by maximizing her profit \(\pi_H = (60 - 0.5(q_T + q_H))q_H - 10q_H\). Taking the derivative and setting it to zero gives her reaction function: \(q_H = 50 - 0.25q_T\).
03

Tito's Profit Maximization

Substitute Helen's reaction \(q_H = 50 - 0.25q_T\) into the inverse demand function \(P = 60 - 0.5(q_T + q_H)\) to express price in terms of \(q_T\). Tito maximizes his profit \(\pi_T = (60 - 0.5(q_T + (50 - 0.25q_T)))q_T - 12q_T\). Simplifying gives \(\pi_T = (33.5 - 0.375q_T)q_T - 12q_T\), then solve \(\frac{d\pi_T}{dq_T} = 0\) to find \(q_T\).
04

Solving for Tito's Optimal Quantity

Solving \(\frac{d((21.5 - 0.375q_T)q_T)}{dq_T} = 0\) results in \(q_T = 28.67\). Substitute \(q_T\) into \(q_H = 50 - 0.25q_T\) to find \(q_H\).
05

Calculate Helen's Output, Market Price, and Profits

With \(q_T = 28.67\), substituting into \(q_H = 50 - 0.25q_T\) gives \(q_H = 42.83\). Total output \(Q = q_T + q_H = 71.5\). The price is \(P = 60 - 0.5 \times 71.5 = 24.25\). Tito's profit: \(\pi_T = (24.25 - 12) \times 28.67 = 349.63\). Helen's profit: \(\pi_H = (24.25 - 10) \times 42.83 = 615.64\).
06

Helen as First Mover (Finding Reaction Function)

Now Helen is the first mover. Tito's reaction function is derived by maximizing his profit \(\pi_T = (60 - 0.5(q_T + q_H))q_T - 12q_T\). Solving yields \(q_T = 48 - 0.5q_H\).
07

Helen's Profit Maximization

Insert Tito's reaction \(q_T = 48 - 0.5q_H\) into the demand \(P = 60 - 0.5(q_H + (48 - 0.5q_H))\), and maximize Helen's profit \(\pi_H = (60 - 0.5(q_H + (48 - 0.5q_H)))q_H - 10q_H\). Solving the derivative, we find \(q_H\).
08

Solving for Helen's Optimal Quantity

The solution of \(\frac{d((36 - 0.25q_H)q_H)}{dq_H} = 0\) leads to \(q_H = 60\). Substitute \(q_H\) into \(q_T = 48 - 0.5q_H\) to determine \(q_T\).
09

Calculate Tito's Output, Market Price, and Profits

With \(q_H = 60\), \(q_T = 48 - 0.5 \times 60 = 18\). Total output \(Q = q_T + q_H = 78\). The price is \(P = 60 - 0.5 \times 78 = 21\). Helen's profit: \(\pi_H = (21 - 10) \times 60 = 660\). Tito's profit: \(\pi_T = (21 - 12) \times 18 = 162\).
10

Value of Helen Being First Mover

The value of Helen being the first mover is the difference in her profit: \(660 - 615.64 = 44.36\).

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Key Concepts

These are the key concepts you need to understand to accurately answer the question.

Inverse Demand
Inverse demand is a concept that defines the relationship between the price of a good and its quantity demanded, but in a reverse framework. The formula given as an example in our exercise is:
  • \( P = 60 - 0.5Q \), where \( P \) is the market price, and \( Q \) is the total quantity produced by both farmers.
This setup implies that as more kale is produced, the price consumers are willing to pay decreases. This negative relationship is an essential feature of most demand curves. Here’s how it works in our exercise:
  • When the total quantity \( Q \) is low, the price \( P \) is closer to 60, indicating high consumer willingness to pay more for lower availability.
  • Conversely, when \( Q \) is high, the price \( P \) approaches 0, showing that with increased availability, price must decrease for the quantity to be sold.
Understanding inverse demand is vital in determining the market strategies that Tito and Helen use in their production decisions.
Marginal Cost
Marginal cost (MC) is a critical metric used to determine the cost of producing one additional unit of a product. In the case of our two kale producers:
  • Tito has a marginal and average cost of \( \\(12 \) per bunch.
  • Helen, on the other hand, has a slightly lower marginal and average cost at \( \\)10 \) per bunch.
The marginal cost influences how much each farmer decides to produce. Since Helen has a lower marginal cost, she has a potential competitive advantage as she can profit from lower prices. This advantages her in situations where market prices fall, as she continues to make a profit where Tito might not.
Profit Maximization
Profit maximization occurs when a firm chooses the level of output where it can make the most profit possible. For both farmers in this Stackelberg game, the goal is to determine
  • a quantity of kale that exceeds their cost of production significantly while taking market dynamics into account.
The basic formula used throughout involves calculating profit
  • \( \pi = PQ - C(Q) \), where \( \pi \) is profit, \( PQ \) is total revenue, and \( C(Q) \) is total cost.
For Stackelberg leaders and followers:
  • The leader determines their production level first, anticipating the follower's response—calculated from the follower’s reaction function.
  • Using these calculations, each farmer can determine the profit-maximizing level of output and adapt to trends or changes in market conditions accordingly.
Through sequential decision-making, focusing on the reaction functions allows players to maximize their respective profits carefully.
Market Price
In the context of Stackelberg oligopoly, the market price of a product is contingent upon the combined output of the firms and the inverse demand function. To find the market price, use the formula:
  • \( P = 60 - 0.5Q \), which involves substituting the total output \( Q = q_T + q_H \).
This means:
  • As Tito and Helen adjust their production bases strategically upon their roles as first movers or followers, they influence the total market supply \( Q \).
  • The resulting market price \( P \) adjusts based on this new total quantity, indicating what consumers would pay for the available kale.
Additionally, the Stackelberg model emphasizes the first-mover advantage in setting a favorable output level that can positively shape market prices to a firm's benefit. Consequently, the skilled integration of market conditions enables Tito or Helen to lead with market prices that optimize their profits efficiently.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

Suppose that the inverse market demand for pumpkins is given by \(P=\$ 10-0.05 Q\) Pumpkins can be grown by anyone at a constant marginal cost of \(\$ 1\) a. If there are lots of pumpkin growers in town so that the pumpkin industry is competitive, how many pumpkins will be sold, and what price will they sell for? b. Suppose that a freak weather event wipes out the pumpkins of all but two producers, Linus and Lucy. Both Linus and Lucy produced bumper crops and have more than enough pumpkins available to satisfy the demand at even a zero price. If Linus and Lucy collude to generate monopoly profits, how many pumpkins will they sell, and what price will they sell for? c. Suppose that the predominant form of competition in the pumpkin industry is price competition. In other words, suppose that Linus and Lucy are Bertrand competitors. What will be the final price of pumpkins in this marketin other words, what is the Bertrand equilibrium price? d. At the Bertrand equilibrium price, what will be the final quantity of pumpkins sold by both Linus and Lucy individually, and for the industry as a whole? How profitable will Linus and Lucy be? e. Would the results you found in parts (c) and (d) be likely to hold if Linus let it be known that his pumpkins were the most orange in town, and Lucy let it be known that hers were the tastiest? Explain. \(f\). Would the results you found in parts (c) and (d) hold if Linus could grow pumpkins at a marginal cost of \(\$ 0.95 ?\)

There are only three big tobacco companies, but they produce dozens of brands of cigarettes. Compare and contrast Bertrand competition with undifferentiated and differentiated products to explain why the big three tobacco companies devote many resources to support so many different brands instead of each producing just a single type of generic cigarette. Do you think supporting all these different brands is good for society, or bad?

Internet users in a small Colorado town can access the Web in two ways: via their television cable or via a digital subscriber line (DSL) from their telephone company. The cable and telephone companies are Bertrand competitors, but because changing providers is slightly costly (waiting for the cable repairman can eat up at least small amounts of time!), customers have some slight resistance to switching from one to another. The demand for cable Internet services is given by \(q_{C}=100-3 p_{C}+2 p_{T}\), where \(q_{C}\) is the number of cable Internet subscribers in town, \(p_{C}\) is the monthly price of cable Internet service, and \(p_{T}\) is the price of a DSL line from the telephone company. The demand for DSL Internet service is similarly given by \(q_{T}=100-3 p_{T}+2 p_{C}\) Assume that both sellers can produce broadband service at zero marginal cost. a. Derive the cable company's reaction curve. Your answer should express \(p_{C}\) as a function of \(p_{T}\) b. Derive the telephone company's reaction curve. Your answer should express \(p_{T}\) as a function of \(p_{C}\). c. Combine reaction functions to determine the price each competitor should charge. Then determine each competitor's quantity and profits, assuming that the average total costs are zero. d. Suppose that the cable company begins to offer slightly faster service than the telephone company, which alters demands for the two products. Now \(q_{C}=100-2 p_{C}+3 p_{T}\) and \(q_{T}=100-4 p_{T}+p_{C}\) Show what effect this increase in service has on the prices and profit of each competitor.

Because cooking soufflés is incredibly difficult, the supply of soufflés in a small French town is controlled by two bakers, Gaston and Pierre. The demand for soufflés is given by \(P=30-2 Q\), and the marginal and average total cost of producing soufflés is \(\$ 6 .\) Because baking a soufflé requires a great deal of work and preparation, each morning Gaston and Pierre make a binding decision about how many soufflés to bake. a. Suppose that Pierre and Gaston agree to collude, evenly splitting the output a monopolist would make and charging the monopoly price. i. Derive the equation for the monopolist's marginal revenue curve. ii. Determine the profit-maximizing collective output for the cartel. iii. Determine the price Pierre and Gaston will be able to charge. iv. Determine profits for Pierre and Gaston individually, as well as for the cartel as a whole. b. Suppose that Pierre cheats on the cartel agreement by baking one extra soufflé each morning. i. What does the extra production do to the price of soufflés in the marketplace? ii. Calculate Pierre's profit. How much did he gain by cheating? iii Calculate Gaston's profit. How much did Pierre's cheating cost him? iv. How much potential profit does the group lose as a result of Pierre's cheating? c. Suppose that Gaston, fed up with Pierre's behavior, also begins baking one extra soufflé each morning. i. How does the extra production affect the price of soufflés in the marketplace? ii. Calculate Gaston's profit. How much did he gain by cheating? iii Calculate Pierre's profit. How much did Gaston's cheating cost him? iv. How much potential profit does the group lose as a result of Pierre's and Gaston's cheating? v. Demonstrate that it is in neither Pierre's nor Gaston's best interest to cheat further on their agreement.

Consider two Bertrand competitors in the market for brie, François and Babette. The cheeses of François and Babette are differentiated, with the demand for François' cheese given by \(q_{F}=30-p_{F}+p_{B}\) where, \(q_{F}\) is the quantity François sells, \(p_{F}\) is the price François charges, and \(p_{B}\) is the price charged by Babette. The demand for Babette's cheese is similarly given as \(q_{B}=30-p_{B}+p_{F}\) Assume that the marginal cost of producing cheese is zero. a. Find the Bertrand equilibrium prices and quantities for these two competitors. b. Now consider a situation in which François sets his price first and Babette responds. Follow procedures similar to those you used for Stackelberg quantity competition to solve for François's profit-maximizing price, quantity, and profit. c. Solve for Babette's profit-maximizing price, quantity, and profit. d. Was François's attempt to seize the first-mover advantage worthwhile?

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