/*! This file is auto-generated */ .wp-block-button__link{color:#fff;background-color:#32373c;border-radius:9999px;box-shadow:none;text-decoration:none;padding:calc(.667em + 2px) calc(1.333em + 2px);font-size:1.125em}.wp-block-file__button{background:#32373c;color:#fff;text-decoration:none} Problem 9 The platypus is a shy and secret... [FREE SOLUTION] | 91Ó°ÊÓ

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The platypus is a shy and secretive animal that does not breed well in captivity. But two breeders, Sydney and Adelaide, have discovered the secret to platypus fertility and have effectively cornered the market. Zoos across the globe come to them to purchase their output; the world inverse demand for baby platypuses is given by \(P=1,000-2 Q,\) where \(Q\) is the combined output of Sydney \(\left(q_{S}\right)\) and Adelaide \(\left(q_{A}\right)\). a. Sydney wishes to produce the profitmaximizing quantity of baby platypus. Given Adelaide's choice of output, \(q_{A}\), write an equation for the residual demand faced by Sydney. b. Derive Sydney's residual marginal revenue curve. c. Assume that the marginal and average total cost of raising a baby platypus to an age at which it can be sold is \(\$ 200\). Derive Sydney's reaction function. d. Repeat steps (a), (b), and (c) to find Adelaide's reaction function to Sydney's output choice. e. Substitute Sydney's reaction function into Adelaide's to solve for Adelaide's profitmaximizing level of output. Then use your answer to find Sydney's profit-maximizing level of output. f. Determine industry output, the price of platypus, and the profits of both Sydney and Adelaide. g. If Adelaide were hit by a bus on her way home from work, and Sydney were to become a monopolist, what would happen to industry quantity, price, and profit?

Short Answer

Expert verified
Sydney and Adelaide each produce 133.33 platypuses, industry output is 266.67, price is 466.67, and each earns a profit of 35,555.56. In a monopoly, output is 200, price is 600, and profit is 80,000.

Step by step solution

01

Sydney's Residual Demand

The world inverse demand for baby platypuses is given by \( P = 1000 - 2Q \). Sydney's residual demand is influenced by Adelaide's output \( q_A \). Therefore, Sydney's demand is \( P = 1000 - 2(q_S + q_A) \), which simplifies to \( P = 1000 - 2q_S - 2q_A \).
02

Sydney's Residual Marginal Revenue

Sydney's marginal revenue can be derived from the demand function \( P = 1000 - 2q_S - 2q_A \). To find this, express total revenue as \( TR = P imes q_S = (1000 - 2q_S - 2q_A) imes q_S \). Differentiate to find MR: \( MR = \frac{d(TR)}{d(q_S)} = 1000 - 4q_S - 2q_A \).
03

Sydney's Reaction Function

With a marginal and average total cost of raising a platypus being \( \$ 200 \), set \( MR = MC \). Thus, \( 1000 - 4q_S - 2q_A = 200 \). Solve for \( q_S \) in terms of \( q_A \): \( q_S = 200 - 0.5q_A \).
04

Adelaide's Residual Demand

Similarly to Sydney, Adelaide faces a residual demand \( P = 1000 - 2(q_S + q_A) \). Therefore, Adelaide's demand simplifies to \( P = 1000 - 2q_A - 2q_S \).
05

Adelaide's Residual Marginal Revenue

Adelaide's marginal revenue is derived from \( P = 1000 - 2q_A - 2q_S \). Total revenue for Adelaide is \( TR = P \times q_A = (1000 - 2q_A - 2q_S) \times q_A \). Differentiate to get MR: \( MR = \frac{d(TR)}{d(q_A)} = 1000 - 4q_A - 2q_S \).
06

Adelaide's Reaction Function

Set \( MR = MC \) for Adelaide where \( MC = \$ 200 \), yielding \( 1000 - 4q_A - 2q_S = 200 \). Solve to get \( q_A = 200 - 0.5q_S \).
07

Finding Profit-Maximizing Quantities

Substitute Sydney's reaction function \( q_S = 200 - 0.5q_A \) into Adelaide's, \( q_A = 200 - 0.5q_S \). Simplify to find \( q_A = 133.33 \) and substitute back to find \( q_S = 133.33 \).
08

Determine Industry Output and Price

The combined output \( Q = q_S + q_A = 266.67 \). Substitute into the inverse demand \( P = 1000 - 2(266.67) = 466.67 \).
09

Profits for Sydney and Adelaide

Profit for each equals total revenue minus total cost. Profit for Sydney is \( (466.67 \times 133.33) - (200 \times 133.33) = 35,555.56 \), and similarly for Adelaide. Both earn \( 35,555.56 \) in profits.
10

Monopoly Scenario

If Sydney is a monopolist, \( Q = q_S \) and demand is \( P = 1000 - 2Q \). With \( MR = MC \), solve \( 1000 - 4Q = 200 \), resulting in \( Q = 200 \), \( P = 600 \), and profit \( (600 \times 200) - (200 \times 200) = 80,000 \).

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Key Concepts

These are the key concepts you need to understand to accurately answer the question.

Residual Demand
In an oligopolistic market, understanding residual demand is crucial for strategic decision-making. This concept refers to the portion of market demand that is not met by competitors, which a specific firm undertakes to serve. Given that Sydney and Adelaide follow the inverse demand curve defined by \( P = 1000 - 2Q \), Sydney’s residual demand needs to subtract Adelaide's output \( q_A \) from the total. Thus, Sydney faces a residual demand expressed as \( P = 1000 - 2(q_S + q_A) \). Simplifying, we find Sydney's portion: \( P = 1000 - 2q_S - 2q_A \).
This formula reveals directly how the actions of Adelaide affect Sydney's market potential. When Adelaide increases her output, Sydney's available share of the market diminishes, demonstrating the interconnected nature of decision-making in an oligopoly.
Marginal Revenue
Marginal revenue (MR) is the additional revenue that a company earns by selling one more unit of a product. In an oligopolistic setting like that of Sydney's platypus business, marginal revenue is influenced by the output of both parties. To derive Sydney's marginal revenue, we start with the total revenue function: \( TR = (1000 - 2q_S - 2q_A) \times q_S \). Differentiating \( TR \) with respect to \( q_S \) provides the marginal revenue: \( MR = \frac{d(TR)}{d(q_S)} = 1000 - 4q_S - 2q_A \).
This equation shows that Sydney's marginal revenue decreases not only as she increases her output, but also as Adelaide increases hers. This relationship is key to understanding strategic interactions in oligopolies, as each firm's decision impacts market dynamics and potential revenue.
Reaction Function
A reaction function in an oligopoly helps delineate a firm's optimal response to the output levels of a competitor. For Sydney, her reaction to Adelaide's output \( q_A \) can be calculated using her marginal revenue and cost considerations. Given that Sydney's marginal and average total cost for raising a platypus is \( \$200 \), and by setting \( MR = MC \), we solve \( 1000 - 4q_S - 2q_A = 200 \). This yields the reaction function: \( q_S = 200 - 0.5q_A \).
The reaction function essentially maps the quantity of output Sydney will choose in response to various levels of production by Adelaide. It reflects how Sydney's profit-maximizing output decreases with an increase in Adelaide's output, confirming the strategic interdependence characteristic of oligopolies.
Profit Maximization
The goal in any market structure, including an oligopoly, is profit maximization, which involves determining the quantity of output that maximizes the difference between total revenue and total cost. For both Sydney and Adelaide, setting \( MR = MC \) is pivotal in achieving this. By substituting Sydney’s reaction function \( q_S = 200 - 0.5q_A \) into Adelaide’s equivalent function \( q_A = 200 - 0.5q_S \), we can solve for their respective outputs: \( q_A = 133.33 \) and \( q_S = 133.33 \).
These outputs combine to yield an industry quantity \( Q = 266.67 \), with each firm capturing a market share that reflects their strategic interactions. Consequently, the market price is set at \( P = 1000 - 2 \times 266.67 = 466.67 \). Profit for each is calculated as revenue minus cost resulting in \( 35,555.56 \) for both Sydney and Adelaide, demonstrating the balancing act of maintaining optimal production levels in competitive environments.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

When competition between firms is based on quantities (Cournot competition), the reaction functions we derive tell us that when Firm A increases its output, Firm B's best response is to cut its own. However, when competition between firms is based on price (Bertrand competition), reaction functions tell us that Firm B's response to a cut in Firm A's price (which will lead to an increase in the quantity \(\mathrm{A}\) sells) should be a corresponding cut in B's price (and a corresponding increase in its own output). Reconcile these two results.

Suppose that three grocery stores sell Bubba's Gourmet Red Beans and Rice. Bullseye market is able to acquire, stock, and market them for \(\$ 2.00\) per package. OKMart can acquire, stock, and market them for \$1.98 per package. SamsMart can acquire, stock, and market them for \(\$ 1.96\) per package. a. If the three competitors are located in close proximity to one another, so that the cost of going to a different store to purchase red beans and rice is negligible, and if the market for prepackaged gourmet red beans and rice is characterized by Bertrand competition, what will the prevailing market price be? b. Where will customers buy their red beans and rice? Bullseye, OKMart, or SamsMart? What does your answer suggest about the potential rewards to small improvements in efficiency via cost-cutting? c. Suppose that each day, equal numbers of customers begin their shopping at each of the three stores. If the cost of going to a different store to purchase red beans and rice is 3 cents, is the Bertrand result likely to hold in this case? Where will customers purchase red beans and rice? Where will they not purchase them?

Jack and Annie are the only sellers of otters in a threestate area. The inverse market demand for otters is given by \(P=100-0.5 Q,\) where \(Q=\) the total quantity offered for sale in the marketplace. Specifically, \(Q=q_{J}+q_{A},\) where \(q_{J}\) is the amount of otters offered for sale by Jack and \(q_{A}\) is the amount offered for sale by Annie. Both Jack and Annie can produce otters at a constant marginal and average total cost of \(\$ 20\). a. Graph the market demand curve. What would be the prevailing price and quantity if this industry were controlled by a monopolist? b. Suppose that Jack solves part (a) and announces that he will bring half of the monopoly quantity to market each day. i. The market inverse demand for otters is given by \(P=100-0.5\left(q_{J}+q_{A}\right) .\) Plug in Jack's announced output for \(q_{A}\) to solve for the residual demand curve faced by Annie. ii. Solve for, and graph, the residual marginal revenue curve faced by Annie. iii. Given Annie's otter production cost of \(\$ 20\), how many units should Annie bring to market to maximize her profit? c. Given your answers to (b), what will the industry quantity and final price of otters be? How much profit will Annie earn? Jack? d. Suppose that Jack observes Annie's output from part (b). Find Jack's residual demand and marginal revenue curves, and determine if Jack should adjust his output in response to \(\mathrm{An}-\) nie's choice of \(q_{A}\). What will the new price of otters be? e. Is the outcome you found in part (d) an equilibrium outcome? How do you know?

When competition between firms is based on quantities (Cournot competition), the reaction functions we derive tell us that when Firm A increases its output, Firm B's best response is to cut its own. However, when competition between firms is based on price (Bertrand competition), reaction functions tell us that Firm B's response to a cut in Firm A's price (which will lead to an increase in the quantity \(\mathrm{A}\) sells) should be a corresponding cut in B's price (and a corresponding increase in its own output). Reconcile these two results.

Because cooking soufflés is incredibly difficult, the supply of soufflés in a small French town is controlled by two bakers, Gaston and Pierre. The demand for soufflés is given by \(P=30-2 Q\), and the marginal and average total cost of producing soufflés is \(\$ 6\). Because baking a soufflé requires a great deal of work and preparation, each morning Gaston and Pierre make a binding decision about how many soufflés to bake. a. Suppose that Pierre and Gaston agree to collude, evenly splitting the output a monopolist would make and charging the monopoly price. i. Derive the equation for the monopolist's marginal revenue curve. ii. Determine the profit-maximizing collective output for the cartel. iii. Determine the price Pierre and Gaston will be able to charge. iv. Determine profits for Pierre and Gaston individually, as well as for the cartel as a whole. b. Suppose that Pierre cheats on the cartel agreement by baking one extra soufflé each morning. i. What does the extra production do to the price of soufflés in the marketplace? ii. Calculate Pierre's profit. How much did he gain by cheating? iii. Calculate Gaston's profit. How much did Pierre's cheating cost him? iv. How much potential profit does the group lose as a result of Pierre's cheating? c. Suppose that Gaston, fed up with Pierre's behavior, also begins baking one extra soufflé each morning. i. How does the extra production affect the price of soufflés in the marketplace? ii. Calculate Gaston's profit. How much did he gain by cheating? iii. Calculate Pierre's profit. How much did Gaston's cheating cost him? iv. How much potential profit does the group lose as a result of Pierre's and Gaston's cheating? v. Demonstrate that it is in neither Pierre's nor Gaston's best interest to cheat further on their agreement.

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