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In deciding to park in an illegal place, any individual knows that the probability of getting a ticket is \(p\) and that the fine for receiving the ticket is \(f\). Suppose that all individuals are risk averse (i.e., \(U^{\prime \prime}(W)<0\), where \(W\) is the individual's wealth). Will a proportional increase in the probability of being caught or a proportional increase in the fine be a more effective deterrent to illegal parking? Hint: Use the Taylor series approximation \(U(W-f)=U(W)-f U^{\prime}(W)+\left(f^{2} / 2\right) U^{\prime \prime}(W)\)

Short Answer

Expert verified
Explain your answer based on the given analysis. Answer: Both a proportional increase in the probability of getting caught and a proportional increase in the fine have a deterrent effect, as their partial derivatives with respect to the expected utility are negative. However, without specific information about the probability of getting caught (p), the fine (f), and the individual's utility function (U(W)), it is difficult to make a general conclusion about which proportional increase will serve as a more effective deterrent in all cases. Determining the optimal strategy for deterring illegal parking requires analyzing these values on a case-by-case basis.

Step by step solution

01

1. Define Variables and Assumptions

Let's denote the individual's wealth as W and their utility function as U(W). We are given that individuals are risk averse, meaning that the second derivative of the utility function with respect to W is negative (\(U^{\prime \prime}(W)<0\)).
02

2. Set Up the Basic Utility Functions

The individual's decision will be based on their expected utility, so let's set up the two relevant utility functions: 1. The utility of not getting a ticket: \(U(W)\) 2. The utility of getting a ticket and paying the fine: \(U(W-f)\) Now, given the hint, we can use the Taylor series approximation to simplify \(U(W-f)\): \(U(W-f)=U(W)-f U^{\prime}(W)+\left(\frac{f^2}{2}\right) U^{\prime \prime}(W)\)
03

3. Calculate the Expected Utility

The expected utility of parking in an illegal place will be the weighted sum of the two utility outcomes. The probability of getting a ticket is p, so the probability of not getting a ticket is (1-p). Therefore, the expected utility of illegal parking (EU) can be expressed as: \(EU = p[U(W-f)] + (1-p)[U(W)]\)
04

4. Analyze the Deterrent Effects of Increasing p or f

To compare the deterrent effects of increasing either the probability of getting a ticket (p) or the fine (f), we will calculate their partial derivatives with respect to the expected utility: 1. Partial derivative with respect to p: \(\frac{\partial EU}{\partial p} = [U(W-f)] - [U(W)]\) 2. Partial derivative with respect to f: \(\frac{\partial EU}{\partial f} = p[- U^{\prime}(W) + f U^{\prime \prime}(W)]\)
05

5. Compare the Partial Derivatives

Now we will analyze the signs of the partial derivatives: 1. \(U(W-f) < U(W)\) since individuals are risk averse, so \(\frac{\partial EU}{\partial p} < 0\). This means that an increase in the probability of getting a ticket will decrease the expected utility and act as a deterrent. 2. \(- U^{\prime}(W) + f U^{\prime \prime}(W) < 0\) since \(U^{\prime \prime}(W)<0\), so \(\frac{\partial EU}{\partial f} < 0\). This means that an increase in the fine will also decrease the expected utility and act as a deterrent. Since both their partial derivatives are negative, a proportional increase in either the probability of getting caught or the fine would both result in a deterrent effect. However, to compare their deterrent effects, we must look at their magnitudes relative to each other.
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6. Proportional Increases and Comparison

We must now examine the magnitude of the deterrent effect: 1. The effect of increasing the probability of getting a ticket by a proportion \(\alpha\) would lead to a change in expected utility: \(\Delta EU_p = \alpha \frac{\partial EU}{\partial p}\) 2. Similarly, the effect of increasing the fine by a proportion \(\alpha\) would lead to a change in expected utility: \(\Delta EU_f = \alpha p(- U^{\prime}(W) + f U^{\prime \prime}(W))\) By comparing the magnitudes of \(\Delta EU_p\) and \(\Delta EU_f\), we can determine which proportional increase leads to a greater deterrent effect. Without specific information about \(p\), \(f\), and the form of \(U(W)\), it is difficult to make a general conclusion about which proportional increase will serve as a more effective deterrent in all cases. However, these values can be analyzed on a case-by-case basis to provide more insight into the optimal strategy for deterring illegal parking.

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Key Concepts

These are the key concepts you need to understand to accurately answer the question.

Expected Utility
When individuals face uncertainty, such as the decision to park illegally and risk a fine, they weigh the possible outcomes using the concept of expected utility. Expected utility helps them to make rational choices by considering the weighted sum of all possible utilities based on their probabilities.

To determine the expected utility of a risky choice, such as illegal parking, two possible outcomes are typically evaluated:
  • Getting a ticket, which may involve a financial penalty, impacting wealth and causing a utility loss.
  • Not getting a ticket, meaning no penalty and the utility remains unchanged.
The formula for expected utility in this context is:

\[ EU = p[U(W-f)] + (1-p)[U(W)] \]

Here, \(U(W)\) is the utility when no ticket is issued, \(U(W-f)\) is the utility after paying the fine \(f\), and \(p\) is the probability of being caught. Risk-averse individuals, who dislike losses, experience a decrease in expected utility when there is a higher chance or severity of fines.
Taylor Series Approximation
To simplify complex functions and make them easier to analyze, a Taylor series approximation can be used. This is particularly helpful when examining the utility of wealth after facing a potential penalty.

In this scenario, using Taylor series expansion, we approximate \(U(W-f)\), the utility after a fine, around \(W\):

\[ U(W-f) = U(W) - f U^{\prime}(W) + \left( \frac{f^2}{2} \right) U^{\prime \prime}(W) \]

This approximation breaks down the change in utility into simple terms:
  • The first term, \(U(W)\), is the initial utility.
  • The second term, \(-f U^{\prime}(W)\), represents the linear loss due to the fine.
  • The third term, \(\left( \frac{f^2}{2} \right) U^{\prime \prime}(W)\), accounts for the curvature and risk aversion, making this correction more significant as the fine size increases.
By understanding these terms, one can better comprehend how financial penalties affect individuals’ decision-making.
Partial Derivatives
Partial derivatives are a useful mathematical tool when analyzing how changes in variables, like the probability of getting caught \(p\), or the fine \(f\), affect expected utility. In assessing the deterrent impact of penalties for illegal parking, these derivatives help to determine the sensitivity of the expected utility to changes in \(p\) and \(f\).

For the probability \(p\):

\[ \frac{\partial EU}{\partial p} = [U(W-f)] - [U(W)] \]

This derivative tells us that changes in probability affect utility negatively because, generally, \(U(W-f) < U(W)\) due to risk aversion; hence, increasing \(p\) reduces \(EU\).

For the fine \(f\):

\[ \frac{\partial EU}{\partial f} = p[-U^{\prime}(W) + f U^{\prime\prime}(W)] \]

This indicates that increasing fines also decrease expected utility since \(U^{\prime \prime}(W)<0\) for risk-averse individuals. Understanding how these derivatives work helps us assess which factor, probability or fine, has a larger deterrent effect on illegal activities.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

Show that if an individual's utility-of-wealth function is convex then he or she will prefer fair gambles to income certainty and may even be willing to accept somewhat unfair gambles. Do you believe this sort of risk-taking behavior is common? What factors might tend to limit its occurrence?

Two pioneers of the field of behavioral economics, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (winners of the Nobel Prize in economics in 2002 , conducted an experiment in which they presented different groups of subjects with one of the following two scenarios: Scenario 1: In addition to \(\$ 1,000\) up front, the subject must choose between two gambles. Gamble \(A\) offers an even chance of winning \(\$ 1,000\) or nothing. Gamble \(B\) provides \(\$ 500\) with certainty. Scenario 2: In addition to \(\$ 2,000\) given up front, the subject must choose between two gambles. Gamble \(C\) offers an even chance of losing \(\$ 1,000\) or nothing. Gamble \(D\) results in the loss of \(\$ 500\) with certainty. a. Suppose Standard Stan makes choices under uncertainty according to expected utility theory. If Stan is risk neutral, what choice would he make in each scenario? b. What choice would Stan make if he is risk averse? c. Kahneman and Tversky found 16 percent of subjects chose \(A\) in the first scenario and 68 percent chose \(C\) in the second scenario. Based on your preceding answers, explain why these findings are hard to reconcile with expected utility theory. d. Kahneman and Tversky proposed an alternative to expected utility theory, called prospect theory, to explain the experimental results. The theory is that people's current income level functions as an "anchor point" for them. They are risk averse over gains beyond this point but sensitive to small losses below this point. This sensitivity to small losses is the opposite of risk aversion: \(A\) risk-averse person suffers disproportionately more from a large than a small loss. (1) Prospect Pete makes choices under uncertainty according to prospect theory. What choices would he make in Kahneman and Tversky's experiment? Explain. (2) Draw a schematic diagram of a utility curve over money for Prospect Pete in the first scenario. Draw a utility curve for him in the second scenario. Can the same curve suffice for both scenarios, or must it shift? How do Pete's utility curves differ from the ones we are used to drawing for people like Standard \(\operatorname{Stan} ?\)

In Example 7.3 we showed that a person with a CARA utility function who faces a Normally distributed risk will have expected utility of the form \(E[U(W)]=\mu_{W}-(A / 2) \sigma_{W}^{2},\) where \(\mu_{W}\) is the expected value of wealth and \(\sigma_{W}^{2}\) is its variance. Use this fact to solve for the optimal portfolio allocation for a person with a CARA utility function who must invest \(k\) of his or her wealth in a Normally distributed risky asset whose expected return is \(\mu_{r}\) and variance in return is \(\sigma_{r}^{2}\) (your answer should depend on \(A\) ). Explain your results intuitively.

A farmer believes there is a \(50-50\) chance that the next growing season will be abnormally rainy. His expected utility function has the form \\[ \text { expected utility }=\frac{1}{2} \ln Y_{N R}+\frac{1}{2} \ln Y_{R} \\] where \(Y_{N R}\) and \(Y_{R}\) represent the farmer's income in the states of "normal rain" and "rainy," respectively. a. Suppose the farmer must choose between two crops that promise the following income prospects: $$\begin{array}{lcc} \text { Crop } & Y_{N R} & Y_{R} \\ \hline \text { Wheat } & \$ 28,000 & \$ 10,000 \\ \text { Corn } & \$ 19,000 & \$ 15,000 \end{array}$$ Which of the crops will he plant? b. Suppose the farmer can plant half his field with each crop. Would he choose to do so? Explain your result. c. What mix of wheat and corn would provide maximum expected utility to this farmer? d. Would wheat crop insurance-which is available to farmers who grow only wheat and which costs \(\$ 4,000\) and pays off \(\$ 8,000\) in the event of a rainy growing season-cause this farmer to change what he plants?

Ms. Fogg is planning an around-the-world trip on which she plans to spend \(\$ 10,000\). The utility from the trip is a function of how much she actually spends on it ( \(Y\) ), given by \\[ U(Y)=\ln Y \\] a. If there is a 25 percent probability that Ms. Fogg will lose \(\$ 1,000\) of her cash on the trip, what is the trip's expected utility? b. Suppose that Ms. Fogg can buy insurance against losing the \(\$ 1,000\) (say, by purchasing traveler's checks) at an "actuarially fair" premium of \(\$ 250 .\) Show that her expected utility is higher if she purchases this insurance than if she faces the chance of losing the \(\$ 1,000\) without insurance. c. What is the maximum amount that Ms. Fogg would be willing to pay to insure her \(\$ 1,000 ?\)

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