/*! This file is auto-generated */ .wp-block-button__link{color:#fff;background-color:#32373c;border-radius:9999px;box-shadow:none;text-decoration:none;padding:calc(.667em + 2px) calc(1.333em + 2px);font-size:1.125em}.wp-block-file__button{background:#32373c;color:#fff;text-decoration:none} Q8. Why is it in the interest of new... [FREE SOLUTION] | 91影视

91影视

Why is it in the interest of new homebuyers and builders of new homes to have government building codes and building inspectors?

Short Answer

Expert verified

The building inspectors and codes will protect the new homebuyers from adverse selection problems.

Step by step solution

01

Step 1. Adverse selection problem in the real estate industry

Adverse selection can create information gaps for the buyers and sellers of properties. This results in buying and selling of buildings or apartments that are not worth the charge. The market price does not reflect the hidden information, which results in an improper allocation of resources.

For example, a new buyer who buys land to construct a commercial building does not know that the land is meant for agricultural purposes. He will have to give up his land once the information is revealed. The wastage of resources in buying that land is the cost of lack of information.

02

Step 2. Role of government building codes and building inspectors in filling information gap for the new buyers and builders

It is in the interest of new buyers and builders of new homes to refer to government building codes and building inspectors to avoid the problem of adverse selection.

The new homebuyers and builders do not have the appropriate knowledge about the property they want to buy. This might lead to improper decisions where buyers buy an overpriced property or a property that doesn鈥檛 adhere to standard safety requirements. Government building codes and building inspectors help provide the standard requirement and rating of the property that helps the buyers make the right decision.

For example, if a woman checks that the building she is interested in buying does not comply with the building codes, she can easily decide not to buy that property. This prevents the future costs of adverse selection.

Unlock Step-by-Step Solutions & Ace Your Exams!

  • Full Textbook Solutions

    Get detailed explanations and key concepts

  • Unlimited Al creation

    Al flashcards, explanations, exams and more...

  • Ads-free access

    To over 500 millions flashcards

  • Money-back guarantee

    We refund you if you fail your exam.

Over 30 million students worldwide already upgrade their learning with 91影视!

One App. One Place for Learning.

All the tools & learning materials you need for study success - in one app.

Get started for free

Most popular questions from this chapter

Efficiency losses _______________

  1. are not possible if suppliers are willing to produce and sell a product.
  2. can result only from underproduction.
  3. can result only from overproduction.
  4. none of the above

An apple grower鈥檚 orchard provides nectar to a neighbor鈥檚 bees, while the beekeeper鈥檚 bees help the apple grower by pollinating his apple blossoms. Use Figure 4.5b to explain why this situation of dual positive externalities might lead to an underallocation of resources to both apple growing and beekeeping. How might this underallocation get resolved via the means suggested by the Coase theorem?

Consider a used-car market with asymmetric information. The owners of used cars know what their vehicles are worth but have no way of credibly demonstrating those values to potential buyers. Thus, potential buyers must always worry that the used car they are being offered may be a low-quality 鈥渓emon.鈥

  1. Suppose that there are equal numbers of good and bad used cars in the market. Good used cars are worth \(13,000, and bad used cars are worth \)5,000. What is the average value of a used car?
  2. By how much does the average value exceed the value of a bad used car? By how much does the value of a good used car exceed the average value?
  3. Would a potential seller of a good used car be willing to accept the average value as payment for the vehicle?
  4. If a buyer negotiates with a seller to purchase the seller鈥檚 used car for a price equal to the average value, is the car more likely to be good or bad?
  5. Will the used-car market come to feature mostly鈥攊f not exclusively鈥攍emons? Explain. How much will used cars end up costing if all the good cars are withdrawn from the market?

Which of the following are moral hazard problems? Which are adverse selection problems?

  1. A person with a terminal illness buys several life insurance policies through the mail.
  2. A person drives carelessly because she has automobile insurance.
  3. A person who intends to torch his warehouse takes out a large fire insurance policy.
  4. A professional athlete who has a guaranteed contract fails to stay in shape during the off-season.
  5. A person who anticipates having a large family takes a job with a firm that offers exceptional child care benefits.

Refer to Table 4.1. If the six people listed in the table are the only consumers in the market, and the equilibrium price is \(11 (not the \)8 shown), how much consumer surplus will the market generate?

Person
Maximum willingness to pay (\()
Actual Price (\))
Bob1311
Barb1211
Bill1111
Bart1011
Brent911
Betty811
See all solutions

Recommended explanations on Economics Textbooks

View all explanations

What do you think about this solution?

We value your feedback to improve our textbook solutions.

Study anywhere. Anytime. Across all devices.