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Consider the weighted voting system \([q: 7,5,3]\). Find the smallest value of \(q\) for which (a) all three players have veto power. (b) \(P_{2}\) has veto power but \(P_{3}\) does not.

Short Answer

Expert verified
The smallest value of q for all players to have veto power is 10. For P2 to have veto power but not P3, the smallest value of q is 4.

Step by step solution

01

Understanding Veto Power

A player has veto power if their support is necessary for a motion to pass. In a weighted voting system, a player has veto power if their weight is greater than or equal to the difference between the total weight and the quota.
02

Identify the Total Weight

First, calculate the total weight of the system by adding up the weights of all players. Total weight (W) = 7 + 5 + 3 = 15.
03

Determine the Quota for Veto Power to All Players

All players have veto power when the quota is greater than the sum of any two players' weights. The smallest value of q to give all players veto power is q = min(7+5+1, 7+3+1, 5+3+1) + 1. Calculate that value using the given weights.
04

Calculate the Minimum Quota for All Players' Veto

Using the above formula, we get q = min(7+5+1, 7+3+1, 5+3+1) + 1 = min(13, 11, 9) + 1 = 9 + 1 = 10. Therefore, the smallest value of q for all players to have veto power is 10.
05

Calculate the Minimum Quota for P2's Veto Without P3

For P2 to have veto power but not P3, set the quota more than P3's weight and less than or equal to P2's weight. The smallest value of q is just above P3's weight, which is 3, and not exceeding P2's weight, which is 5.
06

Determine the Exact Quota for P2's Veto Power Without P3

The smallest quota for P2 to have veto power without P3 is q = P3's weight + 1 = 3 + 1 = 4, as long as it does not exceed P2's weight. Since 4 is less than 5, which is P2's weight, q = 4 is the smallest value where P2 has veto power without P3.

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Key Concepts

These are the key concepts you need to understand to accurately answer the question.

Veto Power in Weighted Voting Systems
Veto power is a critical concept in weighted voting systems, as it signifies the influence a player, or voter, has within the decision-making process. It is essential for students to understand that a player with veto power can single-handedly stop a proposal from being accepted, regardless of the support it may have from others. In the context of our exercise, determining when players have veto power relies on understanding the relationship between each player's weight and the system’s established quota.

In simpler terms, the weight represents the player's voting power, while the quota is the threshold that must be met or exceeded for a proposal to pass. Exercise (a) showcases a scenario where each player is influential enough to block a motion, suggesting a balance of power. On the other hand, exercise (b) demonstrates a dynamic where one player, specifically P2, has enough weight to prevent a motion from passing even without the support of the least powerful player, P3. This exemplifies how adjusting the quota can alter the power dynamics within a group.
Quota Calculation in Decision-making
Calculating the correct quota is a pivotal step in a weighted voting system and is directly tied to how veto power is distributed among the players. The quota is essentially the minimum combined weight needed for a motion to pass. Think of it as a 'passing grade' in a class; you need to hit that mark or higher to succeed.

To calculate the quota that gives all players veto power, as highlighted in Step 3 of the solution, we seek a number higher than the sum of any two players’ weights. By adding an additional point to the maximum combined weight of any two players, we ensure no two players can collaborate to achieve a majority without the inclusion of the third. Alternatively, for exercise (b), we look for the quota that is just beyond the reach of the least powerful player, ensuring they cannot sway the decision without the consent of the more influential players.

Understanding the quota calculation helps to illustrate the delicate balance of power within a group, where each individual's consent may or may not be vital for collective decisions, depending on the structure of the voting system.
Political Mathematics and the Distribution of Power
Political mathematics might sound intimidating, but it plays a vital role in understanding how groups make decisions. This discipline leverages mathematical concepts and methodologies to analyze and model power structures in political systems, like the weighted voting system in our exercise. It provides a framework to assess the fairness of power distribution and the potential impact of individual members' votes.

Through this lens, the weighted voting system can be seen as a microcosm of larger political entities where different voting weights can represent the population or the size of states in a federal government. Hence, political mathematics is not just theoretical but a practical tool for analyzing real-world governance systems. This context enriches the exercises like the ones given here by connecting them to state and international decision-making processes.

Including this broader perspective helps students appreciate the relevance of mathematical concepts in real-life politics and decision-making, establishing a deeper, more practical understanding of how power operates within various systems and institutions.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

The Smith family has two parents \(\left(P_{1}\right.\) and \(P_{2}\) ) and three children \(\left(c_{1}, c_{2},\right.\) and \(\left.c_{3}\right) .\) Family vacations are decided by a majority of the votes, but at least one parent must vote Yes (i.e., the three children don't have enough weight to carry the motion). (a) If we use \([q: p, p, c, c, c]\) to describe this weighted voting system, find \(q, p,\) and \(c\). (b) Find the Banzhaf Power distribution of this weighted voting system.

Suppose that in a weighted voting system there is a player \(A\) who hates another player \(P\) so much that he will always vote the opposite way of \(P\), regardless of the issue. We will call \(A\) the antagonist of \(P\). (a) Suppose that in the weighted voting system \([8: 5,4,3,2]\), \(P\) is the player with two votes and his antagonist \(A\) is the player with five votes. The other two players we'll call \(P_{2}\) and \(P_{3} .\) What are the possible coalitions under these circumstances? What is the Banzhaf power distribution under these circumstances? (b) Suppose that in a generic weighted voting system with \(N\) players there is a player \(P\) who has an antagonist \(A .\) How many coalitions are there under these circumstances? (c) Give examples of weighted voting systems where a player \(A\) can (i) increase his Banzhaf power index by becoming an antagonist of another player. (ii) decrease his Banzhaf power index by becoming an antagonist of another player. (d) Suppose that the antagonist \(A\) has more votes than his enemy \(P\). What is a strategy that \(P\) can use to gain power at the expense of \(A\) ?

Find the Shapley-Shubik power distribution of each of the following weighted voting systems. (a) \([41: 40,10,10,10]\) (b) \([49: 40,10,10,10]\) (Hint: Compare this situation with the one in (a).) (c) \([50: 40,10,10,10]\)

The Nassau County (N.Y.) Board of Supervisors (1960's version). In the 1960 's, the voting in the Nassau County Board of Supervisors was represented by the weighted voting system \([58: 31,31,28,21,2,2] .\) Assume that the players are denoted by \(P_{1}\) through \(P_{6}\) (a) List all the \(t w o-\) and three-player winning coalitions and find the critical players in each coalition. (b) List all the winning coalitions that have \(P_{4}\) as a member and find the critical players in each coalition. (c) Use the results in (b) to find the Banzhaf power index of \(P_{4}\). (d) Use the results in (a) and (c) to find the Banzhaf power distribution of the weighted voting system.

Use a calculator to compute each of the following. (a) \(\frac{12 !}{2 !}\) (b) \(\frac{12 !}{2 ! 10 !}\) (c) \(\frac{12 !}{3 ! 9 !}\) (d) \(\frac{12 !}{4 ! 8!}\)

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