Chapter 1: Problem 59
Explain why the Borda count method satisfies the monotonicity criterion.
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Chapter 1: Problem 59
Explain why the Borda count method satisfies the monotonicity criterion.
These are the key concepts you need to understand to accurately answer the question.
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An election with six candidates \((A, B, C, D, E,\) and \(F)\) is decided using the method of pairwise comparisons. If \(A\) loses four pairwise comparisons, \(B\) and \(C\) both lose three, \(D\) loses one and ties one, and \(E\) loses two and ties one, (a) find how many pairwise comparisons \(F\) loses. (b) find the winner of the election.
The following fairness criterion was proposed by Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto \((1848-1923):\) If every voter prefers candidate \(X\) to candidate \(Y,\) then \(X\) should be ranked above \(Y\). (a) Explain why the Borda count method satisfies the Pareto criterion. (b) Explain why the pairwise-comparisons method satisfies the Pareto criterion.
Explain why the method of pairwise comparisons satisfies the Condorcet criterion.
The following simple variation of the conventional Borda count method is sometimes used: last place is worth 0 points, second to last is worth 1 point,..., first place is worth \(N-1\) points (where \(N\) is the number of candidates). Explain why this variation is equivalent to the conventional Borda count described in this chapter (i.e., it produces exactly the same winner and the same ranking of the candidates).
Consider a modified Borda count where a first-place vote is worth \(F\) points \((F>N\) where \(N\) denotes the number of candidates) and all other places in the ballot are the same as in the ordinary Borda count: \(N-1\) points for second place, \(N-2\) points for third place, \(\ldots, 1\) point for last place. By choosing \(F\) large enough, we can make this variation of the Borda count method satisfy the majority criterion. Find the smallest value of \(F\) (expressed in terms of \(N\) ) for which this happens.
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