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(Bertrand's duopoly game with constant unit cost) Consider the extent to which the analysis depends upon the demand function \(D\) taking the specific form \(D(p)=\alpha-p\). Suppose that \(D\) is any function for which \(D(p) \geq 0\) for all \(p\) and there exists \(\bar{p}>c\) such that \(D(p)>0\) for all \(p \leq \bar{p} .\) Is \((c, c)\) still a Nash equilibrium? Is it still the only Nash equilibrium?

Short Answer

Expert verified
\((c, c)\) is a Nash equilibrium and the only Nash equilibrium.

Step by step solution

01

Understand the Bertrand Duopoly Context

In Bertrand's duopoly model, two firms set prices simultaneously. The firm with the lower price captures the entire market, assuming the product is homogeneous. If both set the same price, they split the market equally.
02

Define the Demand Function

The demand function, given as any function for which \(D(p) \geq 0\) for all \(p\), represents the quantity of goods demanded at price \(p\). Moreover, \(D(p) > 0\) for all \(p \leq \bar{p}\), where \( \bar{p} \) is the maximum price that still results in positive demand.
03

Analyze Nash Equilibrium Given Constant Unit Cost \(c\)

Determine if \((c, c)\) is a Nash equilibrium. For both firms, if they set price equal to the unit cost \(c\), there is no incentive to lower the price because it would result in a loss. If they set the price higher than \(c\), the other firm could slightly undercut and capture the entire market.
04

Confirm \(c, c}}\ is a Nash Equilibrium

Both firms setting the price at their unit cost \(c\) ensures zero economic profit, but any deviation would either result in a loss (if prices lower than \(c\)) or no sales (if prices higher than competitor pricing below \(c\)). Thus, \((c, c)\) remains a Nash equilibrium.
05

Examine If \((c, c)\) is the Only Nash Equilibrium

Evaluate other potential equilibria: If either firm sets a price other than \(c\), it would be undercut by the other firm leading to no sales for the higher priced firm. Hence, \((c, c)\) is the unique Nash equilibrium.

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Key Concepts

These are the key concepts you need to understand to accurately answer the question.

Nash Equilibrium
In the context of game theory, Nash Equilibrium refers to a situation where no player can benefit by unilaterally changing their strategy, provided the strategies of the other players remain unchanged. In Bertrand's duopoly, each firm aims to set a price for its product. If Firm A sets a price, Firm B will adjust its price to capture the market. If both firms set the same price, they split the market equally. The concept of Nash Equilibrium in this scenario means both firms choose a pricing strategy where neither benefits from changing their price if the other's price remains constant.
For our problem, if both firms set their prices equal to their unit cost, which is 'c', neither has an incentive to lower the price because they would make a loss. Similarly, setting a higher price would result in losing market share to the competitor. Therefore, setting prices at \(c, c\) provides a stable outcome where no firm gains by unilaterally changing their price.
This situation exemplifies the unique Nash Equilibrium for this Bertrand duopoly model.
Demand Function
A demand function tells us the quantity of goods that will be demanded at different price levels. In this problem, the demand function is denoted by \(D(p)\) and given as any function for which \(D(p) \geq 0\) for all \(p\). This means the demand cannot be negative and exists for any price. Furthermore, there is a price \(\bar{p}\) where demand remains positive as long as the price does not exceed \(\bar{p}\).
This specific formulation ensures that demand decreases as price increases, which is a normal expectation in economics — higher prices typically lead to lower demand. For instance, a linear demand function like \(D(p)=\alpha-p\) tells us that demand decreases linearly with price. Here, \(\alpha\) represents a base demand level when the price is zero, and the negative \(p\) coefficient shows the decrease in demand with each unit increase in price.
Understanding the demand function is crucial because it determines how much market share a firm can capture at different prices, which directly influences their pricing strategies in the Bertrand duopoly model.
Game Theory
Game Theory is a framework for understanding strategic interactions among rational decision-makers. It is used to model situations where outcomes depend on the interactions of multiple agents, each trying to maximize their own payoff.
In the Bertrand duopoly setting, game theory helps us analyze how two firms choosing prices simultaneously impacts their market shares and profits. Each firm’s strategy must consider the competitor’s potential actions. For example, if one firm lowers its price below the competitor, it captures the entire market. However, if both firms continuously undercut each other, they may end up selling at a price equal to their cost, leading to zero economic profit.
Game theory concepts like Nash Equilibrium provide a way to find stable outcomes in these competitive scenarios. By examining how firms respond to each other's pricing strategies, game theory helps us understand that the equilibrium in Bertrand duopoly occurs when both firms set their prices equal to their unit cost, resulting in no firm having an incentive to deviate from this pricing strategy.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

(Third-price auction) Consider a third-price sealed-bid auction, which differs from a first- and a second-price auction only in that the winner (the person who submits the highest bid) pays the third highest price. (Assume that there are at least three bidders.) \(a\). Show that for any player \(i\) the bid of \(v_{i}\) weakly dominates any lower bid, but does not weakly dominate any higher bid. (To show the latter, for any bid \(b_{i}>v_{i}\) find bids for the other players such that player \(i\) is better off bidding \(b_{i}\) than bidding \(v_{i}\).) b. Show that the action profile in which each player bids her valuation is not a Nash equilibrium. c. Find a Nash equilibrium. (There are ones in which every player submits the same bid.) 3.5.4 Variants Uncertain valuations One respect in which the models in this section depart from reality is in the assumption that each bidder is certain of both her own valuation and every other bidder's valuation. In most, if not all, actual auctions, information is surely less perfect. The case in which the players are uncertain about each other's valuations has been thoroughly explored, and is discussed in Section 9.7. The result that a player's bidding her valuation weakly dominates all her other actions in a second-price auction survives when players are uncertain about each other's valuations, as does the revenue- equivalence of first- and second-price auctions under some conditions on the players' preferences. Common valuations In some auctions the main difference between the bidders is not that the value the object differently but that they have different information about its value. For example, the bidders for an oil tract may put similar values on any given amount of oil, but have different information about how much oil is in the tract. Such auctions involve informational considerations that do not arise in the model we have studied in this section; they are studied in Section 9.7.3. Multi-unit auctions In some auctions, like those for Treasury Bills (short- term) government bonds) in the USA, many units of an object are available, and each bidder may value positively more than one unit. In each of the types of auction described below, each bidder submits a bid for each unit of the good. That is, an action is a list of bids \(\left(b^{1}, \ldots, b^{k}\right)\), where \(b^{1}\) is the player's bid for the first unit of the good, \(b^{2}\) is her bid for the second unit, and so on. The player who submits the highest bid for any given unit obtains that unit. The auctions differ in the prices paid by the winners. (The first type of auction generalizes a first-price auction, whereas the next two generalize a second-price auction.) Discriminatory auction The price paid for each unit is the winning bid for that unit. Uniform-price auction The price paid for each unit is the same, equal to the highest rejected bid among all the bids for all units. Vickrey auction A bidder who wins \(k\) objects pays the sum of the \(k\) highest rejected bids submitted by the other bidders. The next exercise asks you to study these auctions when two units of an object are available.

Consider Cournot's game in the case of an arbitrary number \(n\) of firms; retain the assumptions that the in-verse demand function takes the form (54.2) and the cost function of each firm \(i\) is \(\mathrm{C}_{i}\left(q_{i}\right)=c q_{i}\) for all \(q_{i}\), with \(c<\alpha\). Find the best response function of each firm and set up the conditions for \(\left(q_{1}^{*}, \ldots, q_{n}^{*}\right)\) to be a Nash equilibrium (see \(\left.(34.3)\right)\), assuming that there is a Nash equilibrium in which all firms' outputs are positive. Solve these equations to find the Nash equilibrium. (For \(n=2\) your answer should be \(\left(\frac{1}{3}(\alpha-c), \frac{1}{3}(\alpha-c)\right)\), the equilibrium found in the previous section. First show that in an equilibrium all firms produce the same output, then solve for that output. If you cannot show that all firms produce the same output, simply assume that they do.) Find the price at which output is sold in a Nash equilibrium and show that this price decreases as \(n\) increases, approaching \(c\) as the number of firms increases without bound. The main idea behind this result does not depend on the assumptions on the inverse demand function and the firms' cost functions. Suppose, more generally, that the inverse demand function is any decreasing function, that each firm's cost function is the same, denoted by \(C\), and that there is a single output, say \(q\), at which the average cost of production \(C(q) / q\) is minimal. In this case, any given total output is produced most efficiently by each firm's producing \(q\), and the lowest price compatible with the firms' not making losses is the minimal value of the average cost. The next exercise asks you to show that in a Nash equilibrium of Cournot's game in which the firms' total output is large relative to \(q_{\prime}\) this is the price at which the output is sold.

(Citizen-candidates) Consider a game in which the players are the citizens. Any citizen may, at some cost \(c>0\), become a candidate. Assume that the only position a citizen can espouse is her favorite position, so that a citizen's only decision is whether to stand as a candidate. After all citizens have (simultaneously) decided whether to become candidates, each citizen votes for her favorite candidate, as in Hotelling's model. Citizens care about the position of the winning candidate; a citizen whose favorite position is \(x\) loses \(\left|x-x^{*}\right|\) if the winning candidate's position is \(x^{*}\). (For any number \(z,|z|\) denotes the absolute value of \(z:|z|=z\) if \(z>0\) and \(|z|=-z\) if \(z<0 .\) ) Winning confers the benefit \(b\). Thus a citizen who becomes a candidate and ties with \(k-1\) other candidates for first place obtains the payoff \(b / k-c\); a citizen with favorite position \(x\) who becomes a candidate and is not one of the candidates tied for first place obtains the payoff \(-\left|x-x^{*}\right|-c\), where \(x^{*}\) is the winner's position; and a citizen with favorite position \(x\) who does not become a candidate obtains the payoff \(-\left|x-x^{*}\right|\), where \(x^{*}\) is the winner's position. Assume that for every position \(x\) there is a citizen for whom \(x\) is the favorite position. Show that if \(b \leq 2 c\) then the game has a Nash equilibrium in which one citizen becomes a candidate. Is there an equilibrium (for any values of \(b\) and \(c\) ) in which two citizens, each with favorite position \(m\), become candidates? Is there an equilibrium in which two citizens with favorite positions different from \(m\) become candidates? Hotelling's model assumes a basic agreement among the voters about the ordering of the positions. For example, if one voter prefers \(x\) to \(y\) to \(z\) and another voter prefers \(y\) to \(z\) to \(x\), no voter prefers \(z\) to \(x\) to \(y\). The next exercise asks you to study a model that does not so restrict the voters' preferences.

(Bertrand's duopoly game with different unit costs) Consider Bertrand's duopoly game under a variant of the assumptions of Section 3.2. 2 in which the firms' unit costs are different, equal to \(c_{1}\) and \(c_{2}\), where \(c_{1}

In the variant of Hotelling's model that captures competing firms' choices of product characteristics, show that when there are two firms the unique Nash equilibrium is \((m, m)\) (both firms offer the consumers' median favorite product) and when there are three firms there is no Nash equilibrium. (Start by arguing that when there are two firms whose products differ, either firm is better off making its product more similar to that of its rival.)

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