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A lemon-growing cartel consists of four orchards. Their total cost functions are $$\begin{array}{l} \mathrm{TC}_{1}=20+5 Q_{1}^{2} \\ \mathrm{TC}_{2}=25+3 Q_{2}^{2} \\ \mathrm{TC}_{3}=15+4 Q_{3}^{2} \\ \mathrm{TC}_{4}=20+6 Q_{4}^{2} \end{array}$$ TC is in hundreds of dollars, and \(Q\) is in cartons per month picked and shipped. a. Tabulate total, average, and marginal costs for each firm for output levels between 1 and 5 cartons per month (i.e., for \(1,2,3,4,\) and 5 cartons) b. If the cartel decided to ship 10 cartons per month and set a price of \(\$ 25\) per carton, how should output be allocated among the firms? c. At this shipping level, which firm has the most incentive to cheat? Does any firm not have an incentive to cheat?

Short Answer

Expert verified
a. The total, average and marginal costs can be calculated using the given total cost functions and arranged in a table format. b. Allocating 10 cartons should be done in accordance with the marginal costs of each firm until all cartons have been assigned to the firm with the lowest cost. c. The firm with the highest marginal cost will have the most incentive to cheat because it stands to gain the most profit from selling one extra unit at the market price.

Step by step solution

01

Calculate Total, Average, and Marginal Costs

The total cost for each firm is given. The average cost is obtained by dividing the total cost by the quantity, i.e. \(AC_{i} = \frac{TC_{i}}{Q_{i}}\). To find the marginal costs, differentiate the total cost function in respect to quantity, i.e. \(MC_{i} = \frac{d(TC_{i})}{d(Q_{i})}\) for each firm. Tabulate the values for quantities between 1 to 5.
02

Allocate Output Among The Firms

Next, it is required to determine how 10 cartons should be allocated among the firms. This implies, the allocation should be done by considering marginal cost of each firm. One carton will be assigned to the firm that has the lowest marginal cost, then the next carton is assigned to whichever firm has the lowest marginal cost after the first has been assigned, and so on until all 10 cartons have been assigned.
03

Determine The Firm With The Highest Incentive To Cheat

In a cartel, a firm may cheat the system by producing more output than allocated thus increasing its profits. The firm with the highest incentive to cheat will be the one with the highest marginal cost at this level of output because it would stand to gain the most from producing one extra unit as it could sell the extra unit at the market price and keep all of the profits.

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Key Concepts

These are the key concepts you need to understand to accurately answer the question.

Cartel
A cartel is an agreement among competing firms to control prices or exclude entry of a new competitor in a market. In our example, the lemon-growing cartel consists of four orchards working together. This collaboration allows the orchards to manage production levels and possibly manipulate the market price.
Cartels are typically formed to maximize profits by reducing competition, which can lead to all firms involved benefiting more than if they were competing against each other.
However, maintaining a cartel agreement can be challenging due to the incentive for individual members to cheat the agreement for personal gain. Cheating could involve producing more than the agreed-upon quantity to benefit from extra sales while benefiting from the artificially high prices sustained by the reduced output from the cartel members.
For instance, in our lemon-growing scenario, determining how many cartons each orchard should produce requires close monitoring to prevent cheating.
Cost Functions
Understanding cost functions is crucial in economics as they describe how costs change with varying levels of output. A cost function details the total cost (TC) incurred by a firm at different levels of production. In our lemon-growing cartel's example, each orchard has a specific cost function.
The cost functions provided for the orchards are:
  • For Orchard 1: \( \mathrm{TC}_{1}=20+5Q_{1}^{2} \)
  • For Orchard 2: \( \mathrm{TC}_{2}=25+3Q_{2}^{2} \)
  • For Orchard 3: \( \mathrm{TC}_{3}=15+4Q_{3}^{2} \)
  • For Orchard 4: \( \mathrm{TC}_{4}=20+6Q_{4}^{2} \)
These functions incorporate fixed costs and variable costs based on the number of cartons produced. The mixed presence of variable costs indicates economies or diseconomies of scale, affecting how costs rise with increased production.
Marginal Cost
Marginal cost (MC) is a fundamental aspect of cost functions. It is the additional cost of producing one more unit of output. Understanding it helps firms make decisions on how much to produce. To determine marginal cost, we differentiate the total cost function with respect to the quantity of output.
For example, if we take Orchard 1’s total cost function \( \mathrm{TC}_{1}=20+5Q_{1}^{2} \), its marginal cost would be \( MC_{1} = \frac{d(\mathrm{TC}_{1})}{d(Q_{1})} = 10Q_{1} \).
Knowing the marginal cost helps in allocating production within the cartel. Cartels aim to minimize costs by assigning greater production shares to members with lower marginal costs. In competitive markets, a producer would continue to increase production until marginal cost equals marginal revenue (price). However, within a cartel, the strategy can vary to maintain the desired output.
Average Cost
Average cost (AC) is another key concept in understanding production costs. It gives an idea of the per-unit cost of production, calculated by dividing total cost by the quantity of output. It’s a critical metric for firms to understand their cost structure and potential profitability.
In the example of our cartel, for Orchard 1, the average cost when producing \(Q_{1}\) cartons is \( AC_{1} = \frac{\mathrm{TC}_{1}}{Q_{1}} \). This helps in recognizing how spread the fixed and variable costs are over the number of units produced.
Average costs decrease initially due to spreading fixed costs over a greater number of units, but may eventually increase if diseconomies of scale set in. Firms strive to operate at a level of production where average costs are minimized. This information informs strategic decisions on production levels to optimize profitability while maintaining competitive prices.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

Two firms compete in selling identical widgets. They choose their output levels \(Q_{1}\) and \(Q_{2}\) simultaneously and face the demand curve $$P=30-Q$$ where \(Q=Q_{1}+Q_{2}\). Until recently, both firms had zero marginal costs. Recent environmental regulations have increased Firm \(2^{\prime}\) s marginal cost to \(\$ 15 .\) Firm \(1^{\prime}\) s marginal cost remains constant at zero. True or false: As a result, the market price will rise to the monopoly level Suppose that two identical firms produce widgets and

Two firms produce luxury sheepskin auto seat covers: Western Where (WW) and B.B.B. Sheep (BBBS). Each firm has a cost function given by $$C(q)=30 q+1.5 q^{2}$$ The market demand for these seat covers is represented by the inverse demand equation $$P=300-3 Q$$ where \(Q=q_{1}+q_{2},\) total output. a. If each firm acts to maximize its profits, taking its rival's output as given (i.e., the firms behave as Cournot oligopolists), what will be the equilibrium quantities selected by each firm? What is total output, and what is the market price? What are the profits for each firm? b. It occurs to the managers of \(\mathrm{WW}\) and \(\mathrm{BBBS}\) that they could do a lot better by colluding. If the two firms collude, what will be the profit-maximizing choice of output? The industry price? The output and the profit for each firm in this case? c. The managers of these firms realize that explicit agreements to collude are illegal. Each firm must decide on its own whether to produce the Cournot quantity or the cartel quantity. To aid in making the decision, the manager of WW constructs a payoff matrix like the one below. Fill in each box with the profit of \(\mathrm{WW}\) and the profit of BBBS. Given this payoff matrix, what output strategy is each firm likely to pursue? d. Suppose WW can set its output level before BBBS does. How much will WW choose to produce in this case? How much will BBBS produce? What is the market price, and what is the profit for each firm? Is WW better off by choosing its output first? Explain why or why not.

Suppose all firms in a monopolistically competitive industry were merged into one large firm. Would that new firm produce as many different brands? Would it produce only a single brand? Explain.

Suppose the airline industry consisted of only two firms: American and Texas Air Corp. Let the two firms have identical cost functions, \(C(q)=40 q\). Assume that the demand curve for the industry is given by \(P=100-Q\) and that each firm expects the other to behave as a Cournot competitor. a. Calculate the Cournot-Nash equilibrium for each firm, assuming that each chooses the output level that maximizes its profits when taking its rival's output as given. What are the profits of each firm? b. What would be the equilibrium quantity if Texas Air had constant marginal and average costs of \(\$ 25\) and American had constant marginal and average costs of \(\$ 40 ?\) c. Assuming that both firms have the original cost function, \(C(q)=40 q,\) how much should Texas Air be willing to invest to lower its marginal cost from 40 to \(25,\) assuming that American will not follow suit? How much should American be willing to spend to reduce its marginal cost to \(25,\) assuming that Texas Air will have marginal costs of 25 regardless of American's actions?

Consider two firms facing the demand curve \(P=50-5 Q,\) where \(Q=Q_{1}+Q_{2}\). The firms' cost functions are \(C_{1}\left(Q_{1}\right)=20+10 Q_{1}\) and \(C_{2}\left(Q_{2}\right)=10+12 Q_{2}\) a. Suppose both firms have entered the industry. What is the joint profit- maximizing level of output? How much will each firm produce? How would your answer change if the firms have not yet entered the industry? b. What is each firm's equilibrium output and profit if they behave noncooperatively? Use the Cournot model. Draw the firms' reaction curves and show the equilibrium. c. How much should Firm 1 be willing to pay to purchase Firm 2 if collusion is illegal but a takeover is not?

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