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Suppose that Firm \(1,\) Firm \(2,\) and Firm 3 are the only three firms interested in the lot at the corner of First Street and Glendon Way. The lot is being auctioned by a second-price sealed-bid auction. Suppose Firm 1 values the lot at \(v_{1}=\$ 14,500,\) Firm 2 at \(\$ 19,000,\) and Firm 3 at \(\$ 12,000 .\) Each bidding firm's surplus is \(v_{i}-p\) if it wins the auction and 0 if it loses. The values are private. What is each bidder's optimal bid? Which firm wins the auction, and what price does that firm pay?

Short Answer

Expert verified
Firm 2 wins and pays \(\$14,500\).

Step by step solution

01

Understand the Auction Format

In a second-price sealed-bid auction, each bidder submits one bid without knowing the other bids. The highest bidder wins, but the price paid is the second-highest bid. Bidders aim to maximize their surplus, which is their valuation minus the price paid if they win.
02

Assess Each Firm's Valuation

Firm 1 values the lot at \(v_1 = \\(14,500\), Firm 2 at \(v_2 = \\)19,000\), and Firm 3 at \(v_3 = \$12,000\). These valuations are private, meaning each firm only knows its own valuation.
03

Determine Optimal Bids

In a second-price auction, the optimal strategy is to bid your true valuation because each firm wants to win the lot if the subsequent price (the second-highest bid) is less than its valuation. Thus, Firm 1 bids \(\\(14,500\), Firm 2 bids \(\\)19,000\), and Firm 3 bids \(\$12,000\).
04

Analyze the Bids to Find the Winner

Compare the bids: Firm 1 bids \(\\(14,500\), Firm 2 bids \(\\)19,000\), and Firm 3 bids \(\\(12,000\). The highest bid is \(\\)19,000\) from Firm 2, so Firm 2 wins the auction.
05

Determine the Price Paid

The price Firm 2 pays is the second-highest bid. Firm 1's bid of \(\\(14,500\) is the second highest. Therefore, Firm 2 pays \(\\)14,500\).
06

Conclusion: Result of the Auction

Firm 2 wins the auction and pays a price of \(\$14,500\), which is the second-highest bid.

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Key Concepts

These are the key concepts you need to understand to accurately answer the question.

Auction Theory
Auction theory explores how different auction formats affect bidding strategies and outcomes. A second-price sealed-bid auction is one such format where each participant submits a single bid without knowing the others' offers. The key feature is that the highest bidder wins but pays the second-highest bid. This auction design is strategic because it encourages bidders to bid their true valuation.
  • Incentive for Truthful Bidding: Since only the second-highest bid determines the price, bidders benefit by submitting their true valuation. This way, if they perceive the lot to be worth more than others, they win and pay less than they bid.
  • Simplicity and Fairness: Bidders do not worry about overpaying since their payment equals the value seen by the second-highest bidder. This reduces the risk of what's known as the "winner's curse."
Second-price auctions highlight not only competition but also the efficiency of resource allocation by aligning bids with true valuations. As seen, these features contribute significantly to solutions within auction theory.
Optimal Bidding Strategy
The optimal bidding strategy in a second-price sealed-bid auction is surprisingly straightforward yet strategically profound: bid your true valuation. Here's why this strategy works optimally:
  • Truthful Bidding: By bidding their true valuations, firms ensure they win the lot only when it is economically beneficial. If they overbid, they might win but at a higher cost, reducing their surplus.
  • Profit Calculation: A firm's surplus is calculated as its valuation minus the price paid (i.e., the second-highest bid). If the valuation aligns with the bid, bidders optimize their chances of gaining maximum surplus while securing the lot.
  • Risk Mitigation: True bidding avoids scenarios where guessing leads to overpaying, which particularly matters when valuations are confidential and uncertain.
Firm 2, in this case, bids their perceived lot value of $19,000 and wins, ensuring they only pay $14,500, the second-highest bid, conserving economic benefit. This embodies the logic behind optimal bidding strategies in auction settings.
Economic Surplus
Economic surplus is a measure of the benefit that firms receive by participating in auctions. It comprises the *consumer surplus* and the *producer surplus*. In the context of our auction:
  • Consumer Surplus: This is the difference between what a firm is willing to pay (its valuation) and what it actually pays (the second-highest bid). For Firm 2, the surplus is $19,000 (its valuation) minus $14,500 (paid price) totaling $4,500.
  • Efficiency in Auctions: A second-price auction ensures Firms aim for maximum surplus, thus making allocation efficient. The lot is awarded to the bidder who values it most highly, while not penalizing them with their high bid.
  • Surplus Calculation: Firms lose out on surplus if they misjudge their bids, illustrating the importance of precise valuation in auction contexts.
Understanding economic surplus helps grasp why firms strategically bid to secure lots while minimizing payment, thus reflecting economically sound participation in auctions.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

A gas station at a rest stop along the highway can pay the owner of the rest stop \(\$ 120,000\) to prevent a second station from opening. Without entry, the incumbent gas station's profit is \(\pi_{i}=\$ 300,000\) With entry, its duopoly profit would be \(\$ 210,000\) and the fixed cost to another firm from building a new gas station is \(\$ 45,000\). Will the incumbent pay for exclusivity? Will entry occur? Use a game-tree diagram to answer these questions.

A prisoners' dilemma game is played for a fixed number of periods. The fully rational solution is for each player to defect in each period. However, in experiments with students, players often cooperate for a significant number of periods if the total number of repetitions is fairly large (such as 10 or 20). Why? (Hint: Consider reciprocity and players' limited reasoning ability.)

Show an example of an extensive-form game where a player who moves second has a higher payoff than one who moves first in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.

Charity events often use silent auctions. A donated item, such as a date with a movie star (Colin Firth and Scarlett Johansson in 2008 ) or a former president (Bill Clinton in 2013 ), is put up for bid. In a silent auction, bidders write down bids and submit them. Some silent auctions use secret bids, which are submitted in sealed envelopes and kept confidential. Other silent auctions are open: the bidder writes down a bid on a bulletin board that everyone present can see. Which kind of auction would you expect to raise more revenue for the charity?

In a repeated game, how does the outcome differ if firms know that the game will be (a) repeated indefinitely, (b) repeated a known, finite number of times, and (c) repeated a finite number of times but the firms are always unsure whether the current period will be the last? (Hint: See Solved Problem \(14.2 .\)

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