/*! This file is auto-generated */ .wp-block-button__link{color:#fff;background-color:#32373c;border-radius:9999px;box-shadow:none;text-decoration:none;padding:calc(.667em + 2px) calc(1.333em + 2px);font-size:1.125em}.wp-block-file__button{background:#32373c;color:#fff;text-decoration:none} Problem 16 Internet users in a small Colora... [FREE SOLUTION] | 91Ó°ÊÓ

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Internet users in a small Colorado town can access the Web in two ways: via their television cable or via a digital subscriber line (DSL) from their telephone company. The cable and telephone companies are Bertrand competitors, but because changing providers is slightly costly (waiting for the cable repairman can eat up at least small amounts of time!), customers have some slight resistance to switching from one to another. The demand for cable Internet services is given by \(q_{C}=100-3 p_{C}+2 p_{T}\) where \(q_{c}\) is the number of cable Internet subscribers in town, \(p_{C}\) is the monthly price of cable Internet service, and \(p_{T}\) is the price of a DSL line from the telephone company. The demand for DSL Internet service is similarly given by \(q_{T}=100-3 p_{T}+2 p_{C}\). Assume that both sellers can produce broadband service at zero marginal cost. a. Derive the cable company's reaction curve. Your answer should express \(p_{C}\) as a function of \(p_{T}\) b. Derive the telephone company's reaction curve. Your answer should express \(p_{T}\) as a function of \(p_{C}\) c. Combine reaction functions to determine the price each competitor should charge. Then determine each competitor's quantity and profits, assuming that the average total costs are zero. d. Suppose that the cable company begins to offer slightly faster service than the telephone company, which alters demands for the two products. Now \(q_{c}=100-2 p_{C}+3 p_{T}\) and \(q_{T}=100-\) \(4 p_{T}+p_{C}\). Show what effect this increase in service has on the prices and profit of each competitor.

Short Answer

Expert verified
Equilibrium prices are \( p_C = 30 \) and \( p_T = 40 \). After faster cable service, \( p_C \approx 28.57 \) and \( p_T \approx 32.14 \), with increased cable profit and decreased DSL profit.

Step by step solution

01

Derive Cable Company's Reaction Curve

To derive the reaction curve for the cable company, we need to maximize its profit. Since the marginal cost is zero, the profit \( \pi_C \) is simply the revenue. The cable company will set its price where demand equals zero:\[ q_C = 100 - 3p_C + 2p_T = 0 \]Solve for \( p_C \) in terms of \( p_T \):\[ 3p_C = 100 + 2p_T \]\[ p_C = \frac{100 + 2p_T}{3} \]This is the cable company's reaction curve.
02

Derive Telephone Company's Reaction Curve

Similarly, derive the reaction curve for the telephone company. Set the demand for DSL services to zero:\[ q_T = 100 - 3p_T + 2p_C = 0 \]Solve for \( p_T \) in terms of \( p_C \):\[ 3p_T = 100 + 2p_C \]\[ p_T = \frac{100 + 2p_C}{3} \]This is the telephone company's reaction curve.
03

Calculate Equilibrium Prices

Use the reaction curves to find the equilibrium prices by solving the system of equations. Substitute the telephone company's reaction curve into the cable company's:\[ p_C = \frac{100 + 2 \left( \frac{100 + 2p_C}{3} \right)}{3} \]Solve for \( p_C \):\[ p_C = 30 \]Then, find \( p_T \) using the cable company's price:\[ p_T = \frac{100 + 2(30)}{3} = 40 \]
04

Calculate Quantities and Profits

Calculate the equilibrium quantities using the demand functions:\[ q_C = 100 - 3(30) + 2(40) = 20 \]\[ q_T = 100 - 3(40) + 2(30) = 10 \]Since marginal costs are zero, profits are:\[ \pi_C = p_C \times q_C = 30 \times 20 = 600 \]\[ \pi_T = p_T \times q_T = 40 \times 10 = 400 \]
05

Consider Impact of Faster Cable Service

With the new demand equations reflecting faster cable service, let's solve again:For cable:\[ q_C = 100 - 2p_C + 3p_T \rightarrow p_C = \frac{100 + 3p_T}{2} \]For telephone:\[ q_T = 100 - 4p_T + p_C \rightarrow p_T = \frac{100 + p_C}{4} \]Solve the system of equations:\[ p_C = \frac{100 + 3 \left( \frac{100 + p_C}{4} \right)}{2} \]\[ p_C \approx 28.57, \quad p_T \approx 32.14 \]Profits with new speeds:\[ q_C = 100 - 2(28.57) + 3(32.14) \approx 46 \]\[ q_T = 100 - 4(32.14) + 28.57 \approx 4 \]New profits:\[ \pi_C = 28.57 \times 46 \approx 1314.22 \]\[ \pi_T = 32.14 \times 4 \approx 128.56 \]

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Key Concepts

These are the key concepts you need to understand to accurately answer the question.

Reaction Function
A Reaction Function is a fundamental concept in the study of competition among firms. It captures the way one competitor adjusts its pricing based on the pricing decisions of the other competitor. In a Bertrand competition setup, two firms decide on the prices of their products simultaneously, aiming to maximize their profits.
For the cable company in our exercise, the reaction function is derived by setting the demand function for the cable service to zero. This means finding the price point where the number of subscribers equals zero, given the prices set by the telephone company. Mathematically, if the demand for the cable service is \[ q_C = 100 - 3p_C + 2p_T = 0 \]solving for \(p_C\) gives the cable company's reaction function:\[ p_C = \frac{100 + 2p_T}{3} \]
Similarly, the telephone company's reaction function is found using its own demand function, represented as\[ q_T = 100 - 3p_T + 2p_C = 0 \]Solving this equation for \(p_T\) provides:\[ p_T = \frac{100 + 2p_C}{3} \]
Reaction functions are crucial as they reflect how each firm's price depends on the competitor’s price, allowing us to understand strategic interactions.
Equilibrium Prices
Equilibrium Prices occur when the prices set by competing firms stabilize such that each firm's chosen price is the best response to its competitor’s price. The firms, in this sense, have no incentive to change prices unilaterally as they are already maximizing their profits given the competitor’s price.
To determine the equilibrium prices in our exercise, consider the derived reaction functions:- Cable Company: \( p_C = \frac{100 + 2p_T}{3} \)- Telephone Company: \( p_T = \frac{100 + 2p_C}{3} \)
By substituting one reaction function into the other and solving the simultaneous equations, we find the equilibrium prices for both services:- Cable Service: \( p_C = 30 \)- Telephone Service: \( p_T = 40 \)
These prices reflect the point at which both competitors are satisfied with their pricing strategy, and any deviation from these prices would result in decreased profits.
Demand Functions
Demand Functions describe the relationship between the price of a product or service and the quantity demanded by consumers. These functions are especially important in competitive markets like the one in this exercise, where two companies vie for the same customer base.
The demand for the cable service is expressed as:\[ q_C = 100 - 3p_C + 2p_T \]
This equation demonstrates that the quantity demanded for cable service decreases when its own price increases but increases when the telephone company's price increases.
  • \(100\) is the base demand when both prices are zero.
  • \(-3p_C\) indicates the negative relationship between price and demand for the cable service.
  • \(+2p_T\) reflects the positive impact of the rival’s price on cable demand.
The same logic applies to the DSL service demand function:\[ q_T = 100 - 3p_T + 2p_C \]
Understanding these demand functions helps businesses anticipate how changes in their own pricing and their competitor's pricing could affect their market share.
Marginal Cost
Marginal Cost in economics represents the cost of producing one additional unit of a good or service. For competitive firms, understanding marginal cost is critical in setting prices strategically.
In this exercise, it is given that both firms have zero marginal costs. This implies that producing additional units of Internet service involves no extra cost for either company.
This simplification means: - Companies can focus on maximizing revenue instead of worrying about production costs. - Each unit sold contributes directly to profit since there are no additional costs incurred.
With zero marginal costs, the primary focus for firms in a Bertrand competition is to set optimal prices that maximize profits, taking into account how price changes affect demand due to competitor pricing.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

Suppose that the inverse market demand for pumpkins is given by \(P=\$ 10-0.05 Q .\) Pumpkins can be grown by anybody at a constant marginal cost of \(\$ 1\). a. If there are lots of pumpkin growers in town so that the pumpkin industry is competitive, how many pumpkins will be sold, and what price will they sell for? b. Suppose that a freak weather event wipes out the pumpkins of all but two producers, Linus and Lucy. Both Linus and Lucy have produced bumper crops, and have more than enough pumpkins available to satisfy the demand at even a zero price. If Linus and Lucy collude to generate monopoly profits, how many pumpkins will they sell, and what price will they sell for? c. Suppose that the predominant form of competition in the pumpkin industry is price competition. In other words, suppose that Linus and Lucy are Bertrand competitors. What will be the final price of pumpkins in this market \(-\) in other words, what is the Bertrand equilibrium price? d. At the Bertrand equilibrium price, what will be the final quantity of pumpkins sold by both Linus and Lucy individually, and for the industry as a whole? How profitable will Linus and Lucy be? e. Would the results you found in parts (c) and (d) be likely to hold if Linus let it be known that his pumpkins were the most orange in town, and Lucy let it be known that hers were the tastiest? Explain. f. Would the results you found in parts (c) and (d) hold if Linus could grow pumpkins at a marginal cost of \(\$ 0.95 ?\)

Suppose that two firms are Cournot competitors. Industry demand is given by \(P=200-q_{1}-q_{2}\), where \(q_{1}\) is the output of Firm 1 and \(q_{2}\) is the output of Firm 2. Both Firm 1 and Firm 2 face constant marginal and average total costs of \(\$ 20\). a. Solve for the Cournot price, quantity, and firm profits. b. Firm 1 is considering investing in costly technology that will enable it to reduce its costs to \(\$ 15\) per unit. How much should Firm 1 be willing to pay if such an investment can guarantee that Firm 2 will not be able to acquire it? c. How does your answer to (b) change if Firm 1 knows the technology is available to Firm \(2 ?\)

Jack and Annie are the only sellers of otters in a threestate area. The inverse market demand for otters is given by \(P=100-0.5 Q,\) where \(Q=\) the total quantity offered for sale in the marketplace. Specifically, \(Q=q_{J}+q_{A},\) where \(q_{J}\) is the amount of otters offered for sale by Jack and \(q_{A}\) is the amount offered for sale by Annie. Both Jack and Annie can produce otters at a constant marginal and average total cost of \(\$ 20\). a. Graph the market demand curve. What would be the prevailing price and quantity if this industry were controlled by a monopolist? b. Suppose that Jack solves part (a) and announces that he will bring half of the monopoly quantity to market each day. i. The market inverse demand for otters is given by \(P=100-0.5\left(q_{J}+q_{A}\right) .\) Plug in Jack's announced output for \(q_{A}\) to solve for the residual demand curve faced by Annie. ii. Solve for, and graph, the residual marginal revenue curve faced by Annie. iii. Given Annie's otter production cost of \(\$ 20\), how many units should Annie bring to market to maximize her profit? c. Given your answers to (b), what will the industry quantity and final price of otters be? How much profit will Annie earn? Jack? d. Suppose that Jack observes Annie's output from part (b). Find Jack's residual demand and marginal revenue curves, and determine if Jack should adjust his output in response to \(\mathrm{An}-\) nie's choice of \(q_{A}\). What will the new price of otters be? e. Is the outcome you found in part (d) an equilibrium outcome? How do you know?

There are only three big tobacco companies, but they produce dozens of brands of cigarettes. Compare and contrast Bertrand competition with undifferentiated and differentiated products to explain why the big three tobacco companies devote so many resources supporting so many different brands instead of producing just a single type of generic cigarette each. Do you think supporting all these different brands is good for society, or bad?

The market for nutmeg is controlled by two small island economies, Penang and Grenada. The market demand for bottled nutmeg is given by \(P=100-\) \(q_{P}-q_{G},\) where \(q_{P}\) is the quantity Penang produces and \(q_{G}\) is the quantity Grenada produces. Both Grenada and Penang produce nutmeg at a constant marginal and average cost of \(\$ 20\) per bottle. a. Verify that the reaction function for Grenada is given by \(q_{G}=40-0.5 q_{P} .\) Then verify that the reaction function for Penang is given by \(q_{P}=\) \(40-0.5 q_{G}\) b. Find the Cournot equilibrium quantity for each island. Then solve for the market price of nutmeg and for each firm's profit. c. Suppose that Grenada transforms the nature of competition to Stackelberg competition by announcing its production targets publicly in an attempt to seize a first-mover advantage. i. Grenada must first decide how much to produce, and to do this, it needs to know the demand conditions it faces. Substitute Penang's reaction function into the market demand curve to find the demand faced by Grenada. ii. Based on your answer to the problem above, find the marginal revenue curve faced by Grenada. iii. Equate marginal revenue with marginal cost to find Grenada's output. iv. Plug Grenada's output into Penang's reaction function to determine Penang's output. v. Plug the combined output of Grenada and Penang into the market demand curve to determine the price. How do the industry quantity and price compare to those under Cournot competition? vi. Determine profits in Grenada and Penang. How do the profits of each compare to profits under Cournot competition? Is there an advantage to being the first-mover?

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