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Suppose there is a \(50-50\) chance that a risk-averse individual with a current wealth of \(\$ 20,000\) will contact a debilitating disease and suffer a loss of \(\$ 10,000\) a. Calculate the cost of actuarially fair insurance in this situation and use a utility-of-wealth graph (such as shown in Figure 8.1 ) to show that the individual will prefer fair insurance against this loss to accepting the gamble uninsured. b. Suppose two types of insurance policies were available: (1) A fair policy covering the complete loss. (2) A fair policy covering only half of any loss incurred. Calculate the cost of the second type of policy and show that the individual will generally regard it as inferior to the first.

Short Answer

Expert verified
Answer: A risk-averse individual will prefer the fair insurance policy covering the full loss amount because it provides higher utility compared to the policy covering only half of the loss. The second policy has a lower cost, but the individual's utility is higher with the first policy as it covers the complete loss.

Step by step solution

01

a. Cost of Actuarially Fair Insurance and Preference

1. Calculate the expected loss: The risk-averse individual has a \(50-50\) chance of losing \(\$10,000\). The expected loss can be calculated as follows: $$ Expected\ Loss = Probability\ of\ Loss \times Loss\ Amount $$ $$ Expected\ Loss = 0.5 \times \$10,000 = \$5,000 $$ 2. Calculate the actuarially fair insurance premium: The actuarially fair insurance premium is equal to the expected loss, in this case, \(\$5,000\). 3. Use a utility-of-wealth graph to show preference: To show preference using a utility-of-wealth graph, plot the individual's utility function with wealth on the x-axis and utility on the y-axis. Since the individual is risk-averse, the utility function will be concave. 4. Position of fair insurance and gamble uninsured: To show preference, locate the points representing the individual's wealth when buying fair insurance, accepting the gamble uninsured, and suffering the loss on the graph. As the person is risk-averse, fair insurance will have a higher utility compared to accepting the gamble uninsured.
02

b. Comparison of the Two Types of Insurance Policies

1. Calculate the cost of the second policy: The second policy covers only half of any loss incurred, i.e., \(\$5,000\). The fair insurance premium for the second policy is equal to half of the expected loss: $$ Cost\ of\ Second\ Policy = 0.5 \times \$5,000 = \$2,500 ``` 2. Compare both policies: To show that the second policy is inferior, compare the utility of wealth for both insurance policies. Since the second policy only covers half of the loss, the person would lose more of their wealth in the case of the debilitating disease. In this case, the utility of the second policy is less than the utility of the first policy. 3. Conclusion: Overall, the risk-averse individual will prefer the fair policy covering the complete loss (first policy) to a fair policy covering only half of any loss incurred (second policy). The cost of the second policy is less, but the individual's utility is higher with the first policy as it covers the complete loss.

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Most popular questions from this chapter

Ms. Fogg is planning an around-the-world trip on which she plans to spend \(\$ 10,000\). The utility from the trip is a function of how much she actually spends on it \((Y),\) given by \\[ U(Y)=\ln Y \\] a. If there is a 25 percent probability that Ms. Fogg will lose \(\$ 1000\) of her cash on the trip, what is the trip's expected utility? b. Suppose that Ms. Fogg can buy insurance against losing the \(\$ 1000\) (say, by purchasing traveler's checks) at an "actuarially fair" premium of \(\$ 250 .\) Show that her expected utility is higher if she purchases this insurance than if she faces the chance of losing the \(\$ 1000\) without insurance. c. What is the maximum amount that Ms. Fogg would be willing to pay to insure her \(\$ 1000 ?\)

In some cases individuals may care about the date at which the uncertainty they face is resolved. Suppose, for example, that an individual knows that his or her consumption will be 10 units today \((Q)\) but that tomorrow's consumption \(\left(\mathrm{C}_{2}\right)\) will be either 10 or \(2.5,\) depending on whether a coin comes up heads or tails. Suppose also that the individual's utility function has the simple Cobb-Douglas form \\[U\left(Q, C_{2}\right)=V^{\wedge} Q.\\] a. If an individual cares only about the expected value of utility, will it matter whether the coin is flipped just before day 1 or just before day \(2 ?\) Explain. More generally, suppose that the individual's expected utility depends on the timing of the coin flip. Specifically, assume that \\[\text { expected utility }=\mathbf{f}^{\wedge}\left[\left(\mathrm{fi}\left\\{17\left(\mathrm{C}, \mathrm{C}_{2}\right)\right\\}\right) \text { ) } \text { ? } |\right.\\] where \(E_{x}\) represents expectations taken at the start of day \(1, E_{2}\) represents expectations at the start of day \(2,\) and \(a\) represents a parameter that indicates timing preferences. Show that if \(a=1,\) the individual is indifferent about when the coin is flipped. Show that if \(a=2,\) the individual will prefer early resolution of the uncertainty - that is, flipping the coin at the start of day 1 Show that if \(a=.5,\) the individual will prefer later resolution of the uncertainty (flipping at the start of day 2 ). Explain your results intuitively and indicate their relevance for information theory. (Note: This problem is an illustration of "resolution seeking" and "resolution-averse" behavior. See D. M. Kreps and E. L. Porteus, "Temporal Resolution of Uncertainty and Dynamic Choice Theory," Econometrica [January \(1978]: 185-200\).

Show that if an individual's utility-of-wealth function is convex (rather than concave, as shown in Figure 8.1 ), he or she will prefer fair gambles to income certainty and may even be willing to accept somewhat unfair gambles. Do you believe this sort of risk-taking behavior is common? What factors might tend to limit its occurrence?

Investment in risky assets can be examined in the state-preference framework by assuming that \(W^{*}\) dollars invested in an asset with a certain return, \(r,\) will yield \(\mathrm{W}^{*}(\mathrm{l}+r)\) in both states of the world, whereas investment in a risky asset will yield \(\mathrm{W}^{*}\left(1+r_{g}\right)\) in good times and \(\left.\mathrm{W}^{*}\left(\mathrm{l}+r_{b}\right) \text { in bad times (where } r_{g}>r>r_{b}\right)\) a. Graph the outcomes from the two investments. b. Show how a "mxied portfolio" containing both risk-free and risky assets could be illustrated in your graph. How would you show the fraction of wealth invested in the risky asset? c. Show how individuals' attitudes toward risk will determine the mix of risk- free and risky assets they will hold. In what case would a person hold no risky assets? d. If an individual's utility takes the constant relative risk aversion form (Equation 8.62 ), ex plain why this person will not change the fraction of risky asset held as his or her wealth increases.

A farmer's tomato crop is wilting, and he must decide whether to water it. If he waters the tomatoes, or if it rains, the crop will yield \(\$ 1,000\) in profits; but if the tomatoes get no water, they will yield only \(\$ 500 .\) Operation of the farmer's irrigation system costs \(\$ 100 .\) The farmer seeks to maximize expected profits from tomato sales. a. If the farmer believes there is a 50 percent chance of rain, should he water? b. What is the maximum amount the farmer would pay to get information from an itiner ant weather forecaster who can predict rain with 100 percent accuracy? c. How would your answer to part (b) change if the forecaster were only 75 percent accurate?

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