The equity premium and the concentration of aggregate shocks. (Mankiw,
1986.) Consider an economy with two possible states, each of which occurs with
probability \(\frac{1}{2} .\) In the good state, each individual's consumption
is \(1 .\) In the bad state, fraction \(\lambda\) of the population consumes
\(1-(\phi / \lambda)\) and the remain der consumes \(1,\) where \(0<\phi<1\) and
\(\phi \leq \lambda \leq 1 . \phi\) measures the reduction in average
consumption in the bad state, and \(\lambda\) measures how broadly that re
duction is shared.
Consider two assets, one that pays off 1 unit in the good state and one that
pays off 1 unit in the bad state. Let \(p\) denote the relative price of the
bad-state asset to the good-state asset.
(a) Consider an individual whose initial holdings of the two assets are zero,
and consider the experiment of the individual marginally reducing (that is,
selling short) his or her holdings of the good-state asset and using the
proceeds to purchase more of the bad-state asset. Derive the condition for
this change not to affect the individual's expected utility.
(b) since consumption in the two states is exogenous and individuals are ex
ante identical, \(p\) must adjust to the point where it is an equilibrium for
individuals' holdings of both assets to be zero. Solve the condition derived
in part ( \(a\) ) for this equilibrium value of \(p\) in terms of \(\phi, \lambda,
U^{\prime}(1)\) and \(U^{\prime}(1-(\phi / \lambda))\)
(c) Find \(\partial p / \partial \lambda\)
(d) Show that if utility is quadratic, \(\partial p / \partial \lambda=0\)
(e) Show that if \(U^{\prime \prime \prime}(\bullet)\) is everywhere positive,
\(\partial p / \partial \lambda<0\)